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THE STEEL WORKERS TRILOGY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
ANN C. HODGES* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the United States Supreme Court en-
dorsed the use of arbitration to resolve contractual disputes in private 
sector labor relations, and limited judicial involvement in the arbitration 
process. 1 Pursuant to the national labor policy expressed in the Trilogy 
favoring arbitration, arbitration has resolved contractual disputes be-
tween private sector employers and unions, largely without resort to the 
courts.2 
The Trilogy principles have restrained court involvement in the arbi-
tration process by imposing a policy of judicial deference to arbitration. 3 
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized a very limited exception to 
the Trilogy's broad deference to arbitration, holding that the courts 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1973, University of North Car-
olina - Chapel Hill; M.A., 1974, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; J.D., 1981, Northwest-
ern University. The author thanks Professors John Paul Jones and Martin H. Malin for their 
comments on earlier drafts of this article and acknowledges the valuable research assistance of Judi 
Chartier, Class of 1992, University of Richmond Law School. 
1. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & 
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See Craver, Labor Arbitration As A Continuation of the Collective 
Bargaining Process, 66 CH1.-KENT L. REv. 571 (1990), for a thorough discussion of the judicial 
application of the Trilogy principles in the private sector. 
2. See Feuille & Leroy, Grievance Arbitration Appeals in the Federal Courts: Facts and Figures, 
45 ARB. J. 35, 46 (Mar. 1990); Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 
922-23 (1979). Getman points out that there are strong incentives for the parties to accept arbitra-
tion awards which were present even before the Trilogy made it more difficult to challenge the 
awards. These incentives include the costs of litigation, the disruptive effect of continuing disputes 
on the collective bargaining relationship, and the knowledge that the contract can be modified in 
future negotiations to eliminate the impact of an adverse award. Public management may have 
stronger incentives to resist arbitration initially and to avoid compliance with adverse awards, how-
ever. See Abrams, The Power Issue in Public Sector Grievance Arbitration, 67 MINN. L. REV. 261 
(1982). Abrams notes that prearbitration and postarbitration arbitrability arguments provide an 
opportunity for public employers to attempt to preserve their right to consider political factors in 
making decisions. Id. at 278. 
3. See American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567-68 (in deciding whether the parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement agreed to arbitrate a dispute the courts should not weigh the merits of the 
grievance, for that is the function of the arbitrator); Warrior cl Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582 (a court should 
order arbitration of a grievance "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration 
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be 
resolved in favor of coverage." (footnote omitted)); Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597, 599 (the 
interpretation of the agreement is for the arbitrator and courts should enforce the award so long as it 
draws its essence from the agreement, even if the court would have interpreted the contract 
differently). 
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should not enforce an arbitration award that violates public policy.4 
Public policy challenges to arbitration awards have become increasingly 
common in the private sector,5 and because the Supreme Court has not 
defined the scope of the exception with precision, 6 courts reviewing 
awards on public policy grounds have disagreed over whether an award 
may be set aside on public policy grounds where the award neither vio-
lates positive law nor requires the employer to violate positive law.7 
In the thirty years since the United States Supreme Court decided 
the Steelworkers Trilogy, 8 collective bargaining in the public sector has 
grown exponentially.9 Increasingly, collective bargaining agreements in 
the public sector have incorporated the grievance and arbitration model 
from the private sector for resolution of disputes over the meaning and 
4. See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'! Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 
U.S. 757, 766 (1983). This exception is based on the general rule that a court will not enforce a 
contract which is unlawful or in violation of public policy. United Paperworkers Int'! Union v. 
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987). 
S. Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 2, at 44. See, e.g., Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists 
Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (court rejected public policy challenge to award 
reinstating negligent auto mechanic because no established public policy was violated by the award), 
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 861 F.2d 665 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (award reinstating pilot who had ftown an aircraft while intoxicated was vacated because 
it violated established public policy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989); Flushing Hospital and Medi-
cal Center v. Local 1199, Drug, Hospital and Health Care Employees Union, 685 F. Supp. SS (S.D. 
N.Y. 1988) (award reinstating nursing attendant who had changed an intravenous bag when a nurse 
was not available did not violate public policy). 
6. The public policy must be "well-defined and dominant," W. R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, and 
"the violation of such a policy must be clearly shown," Misco, 484 U.S. at 43. The Court in Misco 
expressly declined to address the union's argument that a court may refuse to enforce an award only 
when the award violates positive law or compels an employer to engage in conduct that would 
violate such law, Misco, 484 U.S. at 45, n.12, but noted that, in W.R. Grace, the Court examined the 
award to determine whether there was an explicit conflict with existing laws, not whether the award 
comported with general considerations of public interests. Misco, 484 U.S. at 43. 
7. Compare Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(court applied narrow scope of review for public policy, refusing to vacate arbitrator's award rein-
stating pilot who had served as a crew member of a plane while intoxicated since the law does not 
prohibit employment of reformed alcoholics as pilots), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988) and Inter-
state Brands Corp. v. Chauffeurs, Local 135, 909 F.2d 885, (6th Cir. 1990) (reinstatement of truck 
driver convicted of driving while intoxicated off-duty and arrested for off-duty drug possession does 
not conftict with any law or legal precedent), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 1104 (1991) with Iowa Electric 
Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, Int'! Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(court can overturn an arbitrator's award without any finding of illegality) and Georgia Power Co. v. 
International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (award reinstating 
drug user vacated because it violated public policy against drug use by individuals who operate 
potentially hazardous machinery found in OSHA provisions requiring safe workplace, criminal laws 
against drug use, and laws that exclude drug abusers from the definition of "handicapped"), aff 'd, 
896 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1990). 
8. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & 
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
9. Coleman, Grievance Arbitration in the Public Sector: Status, Issues and Problems, 17 J. COL-
LECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 89, 89 (1988). 
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application of the agreement. 10 Indeed, some state statutes authorizing 
collective bargaining for public employees mandate that grievance and/ 
or arbitration procedures be included in each collective bargaining 
agreement. 11 
As the use of arbitration in the public sector has increased, the ap-
plicability to the public sector of the Trilogy's deference to arbitration has 
been a recurring issue. Judicial involvement in public sector arbitration 
has varied by, and within, jurisdictions. In some cases, public sector em-
ployers have avoided arbitration by invoking the argument that the sov-
ereign cannot delegate decisionmaking power. 12 In other cases, however, 
this argument has been rejected and the rationale supporting the pre-
sumption of arbitrability13 in the private sector has persuaded the courts 
to order public employers to arbitration. 14 Similarly, in reviewing arbi-
tration awards, some courts have been quick to overturn arbitrators' de-
cisions with which they disagree. 1s Other courts have adopted and 
followed the private sector policy, enforcing the arbitrator's award so 
long as it "draws its essence" 16 from the collective bargaining 
agreement. 17 
The public policy argument for judicial involvement in arbitration 
10. Craver, The Judicial Enforcement of Public Sector Grievance Arbitration, 58 TEX. L. REV. 
329 (1980). 
11. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, ~ l710(c) (1986); MINN. STAT. § l79A.20(4) (Supp. 
1990); ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.210 (1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, ~ 1608 (1986); FLA. STAT. 
§ 447.401 (Supp. 1990). 
12. See, e.g., Lake County Educ. Ass'n v. School Bd. of Lake County, 360 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 882 (Fla 1978); Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teach-
ers Ass'n, 50 A.D.2d 24, 376 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975), aff'd 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390 
N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976). 
13. In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 585 (1960) 
the Supreme Court created a presumption in favor ofarbitrability. See AT&T Technologies v. Com-
munications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) ("[w)here the contract contains an arbi-
tration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability .... "). 
14. See, e.g., Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School Dist. No. 6 v. Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School 
Teachers' Ass'n, 393 Mich. 583, 595, 227 N.W.2d 500, 506 (1975) (relying op the Trilogy principles 
to order arbitration where it could not be said "with positive assurance" that the arbitration clause 
was not "susceptible of an interpretation" that covered the dispute (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 
U.S. at 582-83)). 
15. See, e.g., City of Hartford v. Local 760, lnt'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 6 Conn. App. 11, 502 
A.2d 429 (1986) (award reinstating firefighter who allegedly was involved in a bank robbery was 
vacated because arbitrator exceeded authority); County College of Morris Staff Ass'n v. County 
College of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 495 A.2d 865 (1985) (court vacated award because arbitrator read 
the contract to require progressive discipline prior to discharge). 
16. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
17. See, e.g., Ferndale Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 67 Mich. App. 637, 242 N.W.2d 478 (1976). 
In some states, the courts have adopted the Trilogy standards expressly, see City of Des Moines v. 
Central Iowa Pub. Employees Council, 369 N.W.2d 442 (Iowa 1985), aff'd, 439 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 
1989), while in others the courts use state statutory standards modeled after the United States Arbi-
tration Act. See Community College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver County, 
Soc'y of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977). 
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has played a prominent role in the public sector. It has been argued 
that, regardless of the scope of the public policy exception to judicial 
deference in the private sector, judicial deference in the public sector 
must be strictly limited by public policy because the public employer has 
a statutory mandate to supply public services. 18 In addition, public sec-
tor collective bargaining exists in a complex and diverse statutory envi-
ronment which provides fertile ground for arguments based on the public 
policy exception. 19 Indeed, public policy arguments for avoiding arbitra-
tion or voiding arbitration awards have a long history in the public sec-
tor, and pervade the entire spectrum of court involvement in 
arbitration. 20 
This article will examine the role of the Trilogy principles, including 
the public policy exception, in judicial enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments in the public sector. First the article will review the applicable law 
in the private sector regarding judicial arbitration enforcement. Then, 
the article will discuss the role of the courts in public sector arbitration, 
concluding that while courts frequently pay lip service to the Trilogy 
principles, in reality they often fail to apply them. Finally, the article 
will analyze the arguments for and against application of the deferential 
Trilogy standards in the public sector in light of the distinctive character-
istics of public sector labor relations, and make a recommendation as to 
the appropriate scope of judicial involvement in public sector arbitration. 
Particular emphasis will be placed on the public policy arguments 
for judicial involvement in arbitration because of their significance in the 
public sector. In contrast to the private sector, where public policy argu-
ments are raised primarily in the context of judicial review of arbitration 
awards, public policy arguments in the public sector frequently are raised 
18. See United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 481 U.S. 1301 (1987) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); Kearny PBA, Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 217, 405 
A.2d 393, 398 (1979) (In the public sector, "public policy demands that inherent in the arbitrator's 
guidelines are the public interest, welfare and other pertinent statutory criteria."). 
19. Grodin, Judicial Response to Public-Sector Arbitration, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING 
224, 226 (1978); Toole, Judicial Activism in Public Sector Grievance Arbitration: A Study of Recent 
Developments, 33 ARB. J. 6, 6 (Sept. 1978) ("[Q]uestions of public policy in the public sector are 
much broader than in the private.") See Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, in 
Arbitration-1976, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBI· 
TRATORS 97 (1976) for an argument that the judicial deference to arbitration in the private sector 
will be eroded by the increase in external law applicable to private sector employment. 
20. The public policy argument has appeared in pre-arbitral cases in challenges to arbitrability 
and delegation, and has been used in post-arbitral cases as a challenge to the award. See Mastriani & 
Anderson, Arbitrability in the Public Sector, 3 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 60-1, 60-11 
(1983); Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 278 
( 1978) (pre-arbitration challenge to arbitrability of teacher transfers based on claim of nondelegabil-
ity ); Watertown Police Union, Local 541 v. Town of Watertown, 210 Conn. 333, 555 A.2d 406 
(1989) (arbitration award challenged on public policy grounds). 
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to avoid compliance with agreements to arbitrate. Even where public pol-
icy arguments are not expressly raised, courts appear to be influenced by 
their views of public policy in reviewing the merits of an arbitrator's 
award.21 Accordingly, the article includes a recommendation regarding 
the appropriate scope of the public policy exception in the public sector. 
II. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN PRIVATE SECTOR ARBITRATION 
Arbitration of labor disputes in the private sector has a lengthy his-
tory. 22 While arbitration has been used to a limited extent to resolve 
impasses in collective bargaining in the private sector,23 its use to decide 
disputes over the meaning and application of collective bargaining agree-
ments is, and has been, widespread. 24 Arbitration plays a central role in 
the national labor policy.25 Arbitration is not a "substitute for litiga-
tion," as in the commercial context, but a "substitute for industrial 
strife. "26 Additionally, it is an extension of the collective bargaining pro-
cess, the method by which meaning and content are given to the negoti-
ated agreement.27 The arbitrator functions as the parties' "contract 
reader", a "joint alter ego for the purpose of striking whatever supple-
mentary bargain is necessary to handle the anticipated unanticipated 
omissions of the initial agreement. "28 
The collective bargaining agreement is more than a contract; it cre-
ates a "system of industrial self-government. "29 The grievance and arbi-
tration procedure is the heart of this system. 30 Decisions of labor 
arbitrators are not limited by the language of the contract. Rather, the 
arbitrators are chosen because of their knowledge of the industrial com-
21. See discussion of State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, 91 N.J. 464, 453 A.2d 176 (1982) 
infra at notes 111-14 and accompanying text. 
22. See Coleman, supra note 9, at 89-90. 
23. See De Wolf, The Enforcement of the Labor Arbitration Agreement in the Public Sector - the 
New York Experience, 39 ALB. L. REV. 393, 398 (1975). See also Craver, The Judicial Enforcement 
of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 21 B.C.L. REV. 557, 557 (1980) ("The impasse resolution tech-
nique most often used in the private sector where parties are unable to resolve a bargaining impasse 
through regular negotiations involves resort to a work stoppage."). 
24. See 2 CoLLECTJVE BARGAINING NEGOT. & CoNT. (BNA) § 51:1 (Basic Patterns: Griev-
ances and Arbitration) (Feb. 9, 1989). A survey of some 400 sample contracts by BNA revealed that 
approximately 98% contained an arbitration provision for resolving interpretation and application 
disputes. 
25. "A major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration 
of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 578, 581. 
28. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise 
Whee/ and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1977). 
29. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 580. 
30. Id. at 581. 
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mon law and they are expected to rely on that knowledge in issuing a 
decision. 31 
These observations about the nature of grievance arbitration and its 
primacy in the scheme of national labor policy led the Supreme Court, in 
the Trilogy, to limit the role of the courts in arbitration. 32 When there is 
a dispute over whether a particular matter is subject to arbitration, it is 
for the court to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate.33 Con-
sistent with the policy favoring arbitration, however, the Supreme Court 
stated in Warrior & Gulf 
The judicial inquiry under section 301 must be strictly confined to 
the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the 
grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award 
he made. An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be 
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitra-
tion clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the as-
serted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. 34 
The Court thus established a presumption in favor of arbitrability.35 
Moreover, in determining whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, the 
courts must avoid becoming entangled in the merits of the grievance; if 
there is an agreement to arbitrate, the decision on the merits is for the 
arbitrator.36 And, according to the Court, "[t]he processing of even friv-
olous claims may have therapeutic values .... "37 
The courts have a similarly limited role in reviewing an arbitrator's 
award. In a challenge to an arbitration award, like a challenge to arbi-
trability, the court must avoid review of the merits.38 Such review would 
undermine the important goal of arbitration as a final and binding resolu-
tion of contract disputes. 39 So long as the arbitrator's award "draws its 
essence from the collective bargaining agreement", the award must be 
enforced.40 Even where the arbitrator errs in the interpretation of the 
contract, it is not for the court to second-guess the arbitrator's 
interpretation.41 
31. Id. at 581-82; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97 
(1960). 
32. The role of the courts was defined initially in the Steelworkers Trilogy and further explicated 
in W.R. Grace & Co. v. International Union of United Rubber Workers, Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 
757, 764-66 (1983) and United Paperworkers lnt'I Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38 (1987). 
33. Warrior & Gulf. 363 U.S. at 582. 
34. Id. at 582-83. 
35. AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986). 
36. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568. 
37. Id. 
38. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. "[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting 
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As noted previously, however, the Supreme Court has recognized an 
exception to the general rule of according finality to the arbitrator's 
award where the award conflicts with public policy.42 To date, however, 
the Court's decisions have not identified the precise limits of the public 
policy exception. 43 
The lower federal courts have adopted two different interpretations 
of the public policy exception.44 Some courts have limited the exception 
to situations in which the award is in violation of the law or requires the 
employer to violate the law.45 These courts rely on the language from 
United Paper Workers Int'/ Union v. Misco that states (referring to the 
Court's earlier decision in W. R. Grace v. Rubber Workers): "[o]ur deci-
sion turned on our examination of whether the award created any ex-
plicit conflict with other 'laws and legal precedents' rather than an 
assessment of 'general considerations of supposed public interests.' " 46 
Relying on this and other language from these two decisions, courts have 
refused to overturn arbitration awards that are not in direct violation of 
existing statutory or case law, asserting that any other formulation is so 
overbroad and unprincipled as to permit wholesale destruction of the na-
tional policy favoring arbitration.47 
Other courts have employed a broader notion of public policy. 
These courts will invalidate awards that conflict with policies underlying 
statutory or decisional law, despite the fact that neither the arbitrator's 
decision nor the employer's compliance with that decision would violate 
any law.48 Many of the challenged cases have involved an employer's 
within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not 
suffice to overturn his decision." United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 
(1987). 
42. See W. R. Grace v. International Union of United Rubber Workers, Local Union 759, 461 
U.S. 757 (1983); Misco, 484 U.S. 29. 
43. See Hexter, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: How the Public Policy Exception 
Cases Ignore the Public Policies Underlying Labor Arbitration, 34 ST. LoUis U.L.J. 77, 93 (1989). 
44. Id. 
45. See, e.g., United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239, 
1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1988) (court refused to "impose [its] own brand 
of justice" as the narrow public policy exception did not apply since there was no legal proscription 
on reinstatement of letter carrier convicted of unlawful delay of the mail}; United States Postal 
Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 789 F.2d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (court recognized 
established public policy of consistent postal service operations but held that this policy was not 
implicated by the facts of the case); American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 
789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (public policy exception is designed to be narrow so as to limit 
intrusive judicial review of arbitration). 
46. Misco, 484 U.S. at 43, quoting W. R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766. 
47. See cases cited supra note 45. 
48. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 540 v. Great Western Food, 712 F.2d 122 (5th 
Cir.), reh'g. denied, 717 F.2d 1399 (5th Cir. 1983) (arbitration award reinstating employee who 
admitted driving company truck after drinking vacated on public policy grounds); Georgia Power 
Co. v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 896 
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refusal to comply with an arbitrator's award reinstating a discharged em-
ployee on the ground that reinstatement would violate public policy.49 
An example, drawn from two virtually identical cases with opposite re-
sults, will illustrate the two approaches of the courts. so An airline pilot is 
discharged by a commercial airline for serving as a member of the flight 
crew of an early morning commercial flight after drinking alcohol for 
several hours the night before the flight. A blood alcohol test adminis-
tered at the conclusion of the two hour flight reveals a blood alcohol level 
in excess of that permitted by FAA regulations and in excess of the level 
that creates a presumption of intoxication under the state law that pro-
hibits driving while intoxicated. The arbitrator orders the employer to 
reinstate the pilot assuming FAA certification to fly. The arbitrator's 
decision sets forth two bases for reinstatement. First, the employer has 
not terminated other employees with alcohol problems but instead of-
fered them the opportunity to enter alcohol rehabilitation; second, the 
discharged pilot had an unblemished record in fifteen years of employ-
ment and successfully completed alcohol rehabilitation after the termina-
tion. The employer challenges the award claiming that reinstatement of 
the pilot would violate the strong public policy against operation of an 
aircraft while intoxicated, a policy designed to protect the public safety. 
A narrow view of the public policy exception would require that the 
court uphold the award because reinstatement of the pilot would not vio-
late positive law. No law prohibits the employment of pilots who have 
previously operated aircraft while intoxicated.s 1 A broader view of pub-
lic policy, however, would support overturning the arbitrator's award, 
for there is a strong public policy, and numerous laws and regulations, 
F.2d S07 (I Ith Cir. 1990) (arbitration award reinstating drug abuser vacated on public policy 
grounds). 
49. See, e.g., United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239 
(employer challenged award reinstating letter carrier convicted of unlawful delay of the mail assert-
ing a violation of public policy); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 712 F.2d at 122 (employer challenged 
arbitration award reinstating employee who drove company truck after drinking alcohol asserting a 
violation of public policy); Georgia Power Co., 707 F. Supp. at S3 I (employer challenged arbitration 
award reinstating drug abuser on public policy grounds). 
SO. Compare Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(arbitrator's reinstatement of airline pilot who served as copilot within 24 hours of consuming alco-
hol when his blood alcohol level was .13%, which violated company rules and FAA regulations, did 
not violate public policy), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988) with Delta Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots 
Ass'n, 861F.2d66S (I Ith Cir. 1988) (arbitrator's reinstatement of pilot who served as pilot in com-
mand within 8 hours of consuming alcohol when his blood alcohol content was .13 grams, which 
violated company rules and FAA regulations, violated public policy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 
(1989). 
SI. Cf Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 83-8S. In rejecting the employer's public policy argu-
ment in Northwest Airlines, the court noted that the employer had a policy that allowed reformed 
alcoholics to fly as pilots. Id. at 83. 
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prohibiting operation of an aircraft while intoxicated. s2 
There are persuasive arguments for both views of the public policy 
exception. Concededly, a court should be permitted to vacate an arbitra-
tor's award that is unlawful. s3 Supporters of a broad reading of the pub-
lic policy exception rely on the well-established principle that a court will 
not enforce a contract that violates law or public policy. s4 Although 
public policy is expressed in the law, an award need not be in direct 
violation of positive law to violate public policy.ss Further, it is the func-
tion of the courts to enforce public policy and, thus, the courts are per-
forming an appropriate role in reviewing arbitration awards for 
compliance with public policy. s6 
Critics of the expansive public policy exception argue that it endan-
gers the finality of arbitration, which is crucial to national labor policy. 57 
In the absence of finality of awards, the stability of labor relations sought 
by the policy favoring arbitration cannot be achieved. 58 Furthermore, 
the broad reading of the exception is so devoid of standards that it per-
mits judges to substitute their views for those of arbitrators in direct con-
travention of the Trilogy, and encourages parties to engage in lengthy 
52. Cf Delta Air Lines, 861 F.2d at 668, 672-73. 
53. The doctrine of refusal to enforce contracts violative of law or public policy "derives from 
the basic notion that no court will lend its aid to one who founds a cause of action upon an immoral 
or illegal act, and is further justified by the observation that the public's interest in confining the 
scope of private agreements to which it is not a party will go unrepresented unless the judiciary takes 
account of those interests when it considers whether to enforce such agreements." United 
Paperworkers Int') Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987). 
54. Id. But see Judge Easterbrook's concurrence in E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Gras-
selli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986) (Easter-
brook, J., concurring) ("A power to set aside awards on grounds of public policy, as distinct from 
rules of law, is too sweeping. A court lacks this power for the same reason the arbitrator does-the 
function of arbitrator and court is to carry out a contract, and contracts bind unless made unlawful 
by rules of positive law.") 
55. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, Int') Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 
F.2d 1424, 1427 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987) (court vacated award reinstating employee who had circum-
vented safety procedures at a nuclear power plant, holding that it need not find that the award was 
unlawful to vacate on public policy grounds). 
56. Daniel Constr. Co. v. Local 257, Int'I Bhd. Elec. Workers, 856 F.2d 1174, 1181 (8th Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 257 (1989), quoting Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, 
Int'l Bhd. Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427 (8th Cir. 1987). See Gould, Judicial Review of Labor 
Arbitration Awards, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 464, 491-95 (1989). Professor Gould argues that 
arbitrators could reduce the incidence of judicial reversal of arbitration awards in discharge cases on 
public policy grounds in two ways. First, arbitrators should make specific findings with respect to 
the possibility for rehabilitation of the employee to support awards of reinstatement, and second, 
arbitrators should demonstrate flexibility in denying a reinstatement remedy when there is a public 
policy risk in reinstatement. If these practices were followed, according to Professor Gould courts 
would be more comfortable giving appropriate deference to the arbitrator's award. Id. 
57. See Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public 
Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 34 (1988); Hexter, supra note 
43, at 103-05. 
58. Id. Hexter, supra note 43, at 103-05. 
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and expensive post-award litigation. s9 Also, a sweeping public policy ex-
ception interferes with the paramount public policy of requiring collec-
tive bargaining by employers and unions to achieve the objective of labor 
peace. 60 A final argument against a broad public policy exception is that 
the court, like the arbitrator, is bound to enforce the contract unless it 
violates positive law.61 These two contrasting views of the public policy 
exception have been reflected in the private sector public policy cases 
decided by the lower federal courts since W. R. Grace and Misco. 62 
Ill. ARBITRATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
In contrast to the private sector, where the Trilogy principles are 
uniformly accepted if not always strictly followed, judicial involvement 
in public sector arbitration varies widely. Initially courts held that all 
agreements by government employers to arbitrate constituted unlawful 
delegations of governmental authority. 63 Despite increasing judicial rec-
ognition of the authority of public employers to agree to arbitrate certain 
disputes, this theory of nondelegability remains viable with respect to 
certain issues. 64 Moreover, courts historically have been less deferential 
59. Edwards, supra note 57, at 23 and 34; Hexter, supra note 43, at 103-05. 
60. Edwards, supra note 57, at 23-29. Judge Edwards notes that a court invalidating an arbitra-
tion award on public policy grounds usurps the function of the National Labor Relations Board, 
which is to determine which subjects of bargaining are mandatory under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. Id. at 28. 
61. See E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 
618 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("A power to set 
aside awards on ground of public policy, as distinct from rules of law is too sweeping. A court lacks 
this power for the same reason the arbitrator does-the function of arbitrator and court is to carry 
out a contract, and contracts bind unless made unlawful by rules of positive law."). 
62. While there was an occasional challenge to an arbitration award based on public policy 
prior to the Supreme Court's recent decisions in W. R. Grace and Misco, see. e.g., Local 453, Int'I 
Union ofElec. Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963), 
those two cases, in spite of what appears to be narrow language regarding the public policy excep-
tion, have spawned a number of private sector cases alleging that arbitrators' decisions violate public 
policy. Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 2, at 44. Feuille & LeRoy note, however, that despite the 
increase in the number of public policy challenges in the 1980s, they remain a small percentage of all 
appeals. Id. See, e.g., Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinist Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th 
Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2205 (1989) (court applied narrow public policy exception), Delta 
Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 861F.2d665 (!Ith Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 
(1989) (court applied broad public policy exception); Iowa Blee. Light and Power Company v. Local 
Union 204, Int'! Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987) (court applied broad public 
policy exception). See Craver, supra note I, at 35-44 for a thorough discussion of the judicial appli-
cation of the public policy exception in cases under the National Labor Relations Act. Craver ar-
gues persuasively that courts should not invalidate arbitration awards unless "the action ordered by 
the arbitrator would be wholly improper if directed by the negotiating parties themselves." Id. at 43. 
63. Craver, supra note 10, at 333. 
64. Id. at 338-341; Comment, Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1611, 1719-21 (1984); Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-66 to 60-67 (1983). See, 
e.g., Lake County Educ. Ass'n v. School Bd., 360 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 366 
So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1978) (elected school board has the exclusive prerogative to decide whether or not to 
1990) THE PUBLIC SECTOR 641 
to arbitration of grievances in the public sector, demonstrating both a 
reluctance to order arbitration in the absence of a clear agreement to 
arbitrate the dispute at issue, and a willingness to set aside awards with 
which they disagree.6s 
In recent years, many states have adopted the Trilogy principles, or 
standards analogous to the Trilogy, for arbitrability and enforcement de-
terminations in the public sector. 66 Despite adoption of the Trilogy stan-
dards in theory, however, the deference suggested by these standards is 
often ignored in practice. 67 
A. Arbitrability Determinations in the Public Sector 
The issue of arbitrability may arise at any point during the arbitra-
tion process. The courts68 may be faced with determining arbitrability 
reappoint nontenured teacher); Berkshire Hills Regional School Dist. Comm. v. Berkshire Hills 
Educ. Ass'n, 375 Mass. 522, 377 N.E.2d 940 (1978) (the appointment of a school principal is nondel-
egable, hence not a proper matter for arbitration); Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers Local 59 v. Min-
neapolis Special School Dist. No. I, 258 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 1977) (decision to transfer a number of 
teachers is not arbitrable as it is a managerial decision); Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwau-
kee, 113 Wis.2d 192, 335 N.W.2d 417 (1983) (discharge of probationary police officer is 
nondelegable). 
65. See Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-62. 
66. Craver, supra note 10, at 333-41. 
67. This is not to suggest that courts consistently follow the deferential standards of the Trilogy 
in the private sector. See, e.g., Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers Union, Local 1645, 362 F.2d 
677 (2nd Cir. 1966). Indeed, in recent years, court decisions overturning public sector arbitration 
awards may be no more common than those overturning private sector awards. Compare Northwest 
Airlines, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 894 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 
1990) (award vacated because it did not draw its essence from the bargaining agreement); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 429 v. Toshiba America, Inc., 879 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(court recognized the limited standard of judicial review mandated by the Trilogy, but vacated the 
award regardless because the arbitrator did not conform to the terms of the agreement); Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, United Paperworkers Int'! Union, 864 F.2d 940, 944 (1st Cir. 1988) quot-
ing United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (arbitrator 
cannot substitute "his own brand of industrial justice" for what is required by the contract) with 
Board of Trustees for State Technical Colleges v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, Local 
1942, 179 Conn. 184, 425 A.2d 1247 (1979) (judicial review of the legality of the award does not 
conflict with the scope of review explained in the Trilogy); Musser v. County of Centre, 101 Pa. 
Commw. 193, 515 A.2d 1027 (1986), ajf'd, 519 Pa. 380, 548 A.2d 1194 (1988) (court purported to 
adhere to the Trilogy's "essence" test, but vacated the award because the arbitrator exceeded 
authority). 
68. Typically, in the public sector as in the private sector, see United Steelworkers v. Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960), the responsibility of deciding substantive arbitrability 
belongs to the courts. In some states, however, the arbitrator has the initial task of deciding whether 
the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute, subject to review by the court in an action to set 
aside or confirm the award. See, e.g., Taylor v. Crane, 24 Cal.3d 442, 595 P.2d 129, 155 Cal. Rptr. 
695 (1979); Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 66, 391 
A.2d 1318 (1978); State v. AFSCME Council 4, 13 Conn. App. 461, 537 A.2d 517 (1988). In some 
states, it is the function of the administrative agency created by the collective bargaining law to 
determine arbitrability. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Warren Township High School Dist. 121 v. 
Warren Township High School Fed'n of Teachers, 128 Ill. 2d 155, 538 N.E.2d 524 (1989)(Illinois 
Educational Labor Relations Act divested circuit courts of power to determine the arbitrability of 
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before or after the arbitration.69 One party, typically the employer, may 
refuse to arbitrate a grievance on the grounds that the grievance is not 
arbitrable. A court will confront this issue either in an action to compel 
arbitration by the union or an action to stay arbitration by the employer. 
In either case, the court must determine whether the parties agreed to 
grievances); Board of Educ. of Danville Community Cons. School Dist. No. 118 v. Illinois Educ. 
Labor Relations Bd., 175 Ill. App. 3d 347, 529 N.E.2d 1110 (1988), cert. denied, 124 Ill. 2d 553, 535 
N.E.2d 912 (1989) (same); Snow, The Steelworkers Trilogy in Oregon's Public Sector, 21 WILLAM-
ETIE L. REV. 445, 455 (1985) ("(w]hen a party to a public sector collective bargaining agreement 
refuses to submit a dispute to arbitration or to implement an arbitration award, the other party may 
file an unfair labor practice complaint with the [Employment Relations Board in Oregon).") In 
contrast to substantive arbitrability claims, procedural arbitrability claims, such as arguments that a 
grievance was not timely filed under the contract, are left to the arbitrator in both the private and 
public sectors, subject to review in the same manner as the disposition on the merits. See Town of 
East Hartford v. East Hartford Municipal Employees Union, Inc., 206 Conn. 643, 651-54, 539 A.2d 
125, 130-32 (1988); Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-24 and 60-25. 
69. Post-arbitration challenges to legal arbitrability differ little from pre-arbitration challenges 
to legal arbitrability. Cases involving appointment, promotion and nonrenewal of teachers are as 
common among post-arbitration judicial review cases as they are among pre-arbitration arbitrability 
cases. See, e.g., Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 
878, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976) (arbitration award requiring reinstatement of nontenured teacher which 
would provide tenure by operation of statute void as against public policy, so court modified award 
to require reinstatement for additional nontenured year); School Comm. of Peabody v. Int'! Union of 
Elec. Workers, Local 294, 19 Mass. App. 449, 475 N.E.2d 410 (1985) (court set aside arbitration 
award holding that employer violated contract by failing to appoint two employees to positions of 
assistant high school principal because appointment nondelegable); Meehan v. Nassau Community 
College, 152 A.D.2d 313, 548 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1989) (award of grievance board which found that the 
employer violated the agreement by failing to assign courses to teachers solely on the basis of senior-
ity unenforceable as against public policy); Board of Educ. of Danville Community Cons. School 
Dist. No. 118 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 175 Ill. App. 3d 347, 529 N.E.2d 1110 (1988) 
(arbitrator's determination that school board's refusal to assign tenured teacher to extracurricular 
coaching position violated the collective bargaining agreement not void as against public policy of 
nondelegability expressed in School Code), cert. denied, 124 Ill. 2d 553, 535 N.E.2d 912 (1989). 
Compare Teaneck Bd. of Educ. v. Teaneck Teachers Ass'n, 94 N.J. 9, 462 A.2d 137 (1983) (claim of 
discrimination in appointment not arbitrable because appointment decisions are managerial preroga-
tives) with Blue Hills Regional Dist. School Comm. v. Flight, 383 Mass. 642, 421 N.E.2d 755 (1981) 
(award of arbitrator compelling employer to appoint teacher to administrative position which she 
was denied because of her sex does not implicate the nondelegability doctrine because it is no more 
intrusive on managerial prerogative than the same decision by an independent commission enforcing 
laws against discrimination). 
In post-award challenges to arbitrability the party contesting arbitrability has a concrete award 
to demonstrate the interference with governmental decisionmaking authority rather than a more 
speculative assertion that arbitration will interfere with that authority. See School Comm. of South-
bridge v. Brown, 375 Mass. 502, 506, 377 N.E.2d 935, 937 (1978) (stay denied because a petition to 
stay arbitration should not be allowed simply because a possible remedy might intrude on the non-
delegable authority of a school committee); Riverhead Central School Dist. v. Riverhead Central 
Faculty Ass'n, 528 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613, 140 A.D.2d 526, 527 (stay denied because in deciding an 
application for a stay, a court should not asume prematurely that the only remedy to be granted is an 
impermissible one), appeal denied, 72 N.Y.2d 810, 534 N.Y.S.2d 938, 531 N.E.2d 658 (1988); En-
larged City School Dist. v. Troy Teachers Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d 905, 508 N.E.2d 930, 516 N.Y.S.2d 195 
(1987) (lower court's decision to stay arbitration was error and reversed because there was possible 
relief in the arbitration proceeding that would not violate public policy); Pennsylvania Labor Rela-
tions Bd. v. Bald Eagle Area Educ. Ass'n, 499 Pa. 62, 67, 451 A.2d 671, 673 (1982) (stay denied 
because courts have no reason to assume an arbitrator will ignore the law and possibly fashion an 
invalid award). 
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arbitrate the disputed issue. 70 The issue of arbitrability also may arise 
after arbitration, when the losing party contends that the award is unen-
forceable because the grievance was not arbitrable.71 The losing party 
also may assert other grounds for overturning the award, either as a de-
fense to an action for enforcement of the award or in an action to vacate 
the award. 72 
Determinations of arbitrability fall into two categories--contractual 
arbitrability and legal arbitrability. 73 Contractual arbitrability concerns 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue, while legal arbitrability 
concerns whether the parties lawfully could agree to allow the arbitrator 
70. The first two cases in the Steelworkers Trilogy, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) and United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 
(1960), were actions to compel arbitration. 
71. The post-award challenge to arbitrability will be made in an action to vacate the award or 
as a defense to an action to enforce the award. See City of Des Moines v. Central Iowa Pub. Em-
ployees Council, 369 N.W.2d 442 (Iowa 1985), aff'd, 439 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1989) (city's petition to 
vacate award was denied, as court held the arbitrator had authority to decide arbitrability); Bing-
hamton Civil Service Forum v. City of Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 374 N.E.2d 380, 403 N.Y.S.2d 
482 (1978) (court denied city's challenge to the arbitrability as a defense in the union's confirmation 
action since the city had agreed to submit the question to the arbitrator in the first place). Under 
some circumstances, a party challenging arbitrability after issuance of an award may be held to have 
waived the right to contest arbitrability. See Borough of Naugatuck v. AFSCME Council 4, 190 
Conn. 323, 460 A.2d 1285 (1983) (borough should have sought the aid of the court in determining 
arbitrability before submitting the question to arbitration; since it did not, it could not challenge 
arbitrability later); Port Huron Area School Dist. v. Port Huron Educ. Ass'n, 426 Mich. 143, 393 
N.W.2d 811 (1986) (a party who voluntarily submits a grievance to arbitration may be precluded 
from later challenging the arbitrability of that grievance, although the same party does not waive the 
right to challenge the award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority); Binghamton 
Civil Service Forum v. City ofBinghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 374 N.E.2d 380, 403 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1978) 
(once the city actively participated in the arbitration process, it waived any objection it may have 
had as to the issue's arbitrability); City of New Haven v. AFSCME Council 15, 208 Conn. 411, 544 
A.2d 186 (1988) (where city submitted arbitrability issue to the arbitrators, it is as bound by the 
arbitrators' decision on that issue as it is on any other issue). Other states, however, encourage the 
parties to arbitrate the dispute and litigate arbitrability afterwards, if necessary. See Board of Educ. 
of Community Unit School Dist. No. 4 v. Champaign Educ. Ass'n, 15 Ill. App. 3d 335, 342, 304 
N.E.2d 138, 143 (1973) (a timely objection to arbitrability preserves the right to challenge the award 
after participating in the arbitration process); Board of Trustees v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations 
Bd., 173 Ill. App. 3d 395, 413, 527 N.E.2d 538, 550 (1988) (consideration ofnondelegability argu-
ment best postponed until after arbitration); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Bald Eagle Area 
School Dist., 499 Pa. 62, 451 A.2d 671 (1982) (objections to arbitrability should be presented to the 
arbitrator first, subject to appropriate court review of the award). As noted by Craver, supra note 
10, at 345, the latter is the better rule, for it eliminates potentially unnecessary court challenges. See 
Firefighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 614, 526 P.2d 971, 975, 116 Cal. 
Rptr. 507, 511 (1974). The disadvantage of such a rule, however, is that by proceeding to arbitration 
and challenging the award only if the decision is unfavorable, employers may foster unrest among 
the employees who perceive that the employer is undermining the grievance procedure. Some courts 
also have held that failure to petition the court to set aside an award as inarbitrable within the 
statutory time frame waives the right to raise the issue in defense of an action for enforcement. See 
Burt v. Duval County School Bd., 481 So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). This rule may serve 
to eliminate frivolous arbitrability arguments. 
72. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. 
73. These two categorizations were used by Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-6 and 
60-22. 
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to decide the issue at hand. Legal arbitrability issues are rare in the pri-
vate sector but relatively common in the public sector, primarily because 
of the nondelegability issue. 74 Pre-arbitration issues of legal arbitrability 
implicate many of the same public policy questions faced by the courts in 
reviewing awards for consistency with law and public policy.75 A review 
of several cases dealing with each type of arbitrability issue will demon-
strate the various standards used by public sector courts deciding arbi-
trability questions. 
1. Contractual Arbitrability 
In deciding issues of contractual arbitrability, many public sector 
courts have adopted the private sector presumption of arbitrability set 
forth in the Steelworkers Trilogy. 76 For example, in Kaleva-Norman-
Dickson School District v. Kaleva-Norman Dickson School Teachers' 
Ass'n, 77 the Michigan Supreme Court held arbitrable a teacher's claim 
that the school board's refusal to renew her contract was a breach of the 
collective bargaining agreement, stating "(t]he policy favoring arbitration 
of disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements, as enunciated 
by the United States Supreme Court in the Steelworkers' Trilogy, is ap-
propriate for contracts entered into under the PERA."78 Despite the fact 
that the agreement contained a strong management rights clause, the 
court looked solely at the arbitration clause and found no evidence of 
exclusion of nonrenewal claims from arbitration. The issue of whether 
nonrenewal was a right reserved to management was an issue of the mer-
its, according to the court, and the decision on the merits was committed 
to the arbitrator not the courts. In reversing the lower courts, which had 
enjoined arbitration based on their interpretation of the management 
rights clause, the Michigan Supreme Court heeded the admonition of the 
United States Supreme Court that a court "should view with suspicion 
an attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the construction of the 
substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even through the back door 
of interpreting the arbitration clause, when the alternative is to utilize the 
services of an arbitrator."79 
74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
75. See infra notes 125-61 and accompanying text, for discussion of review of awards on public 
policy grounds. 
76. Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-22 to 60-23. 
77. 393 Mich. 583, 227 N.W.2d 500 (1975). 
78. 393 Mich. at 590-92, 227 N.W.2d at 503-04 (citations omitted). The PERA is the Michigan 
Public Employment Relations Act. Id. at 590, 227 N.E.2d at 503. 
79. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960). The 
decision in Kaleva-Norman-Dickson was based solely on contractual arbitrability. The court did not 
deal with the question of legal arbitrability which frequently is raised in cases involving nonrenewal 
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Although many courts purport to have accepted the Trilogy princi-
ples for resolving arbitrability disputes in the public sector, in actual 
practice some courts have demonstrated less willingness to refrain from 
involvement in the merits than the Michigan Supreme Court showed in 
Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School District. In Policemen's & Firemen's Re-
tirement Board v. Sullivan, 80 the Connecticut Supreme Court quoted 
with approval Warrior & Gulf's counsel that any "[d]oubts [concerning 
arbitrability] should be resolved in favor of coverage."81 Nevertheless, 
the court held that a grievance regarding the disability provisions of the 
pension plan was not arbitrable. The court reached this conclusion de-
spite the fact that the arbitration clause applied to the interpretation and 
application of the articles of the agreement and Article 15 of the agree-
ment expressly stated that the two police pension plans would continue 
to be the pension plans for specified groups of employees. According to 
the court, because the pension plans were created by the legislature and 
were neither set forth verbatim in the agreement nor expressly incorpo-
rated in the agreement, the parties could not have intended to arbitrate 
disputes over pensions. In a dissenting opinion in Sullivan, Justice Loi-
selle criticized the majority for weighing the merits of the dispute in the 
guise of determining arbitrability.82 
Similarly, in Portland Association of Teachers v. Portland School Dis-
trict No. 1, 83 the Oregon Appellate Court affirmed a decision by the Ore-
gon Employment Relations Board ("ERB") denying an order to 
arbitrate. The ERB found that the collective bargaining agreement 
unambiguously provided that the use of a certain procedure for teacher 
evaluation was permissive, not mandatory as contended by the union in 
its grievance, and therefore arbitration was not required. 84 In making 
this determination, both the ERB and the court engaged in contractual 
interpretation of the dispute's merits, violating the principles of Warrior 
& Gulf while purporting to rely on that decision. 85 
While the Sullivan and Portland courts paid lip service to the Tri/-
of probationary teachers. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. Cf Brown v. Holton Pub. 
Schools, 401 Mich. 398, 258 N.W.2d 51 (1977) where the court was faced with a legal arbitrability 
challenge to a grievance over nonrenewal of a probationary teacher, but found it unnecessary to rule 
on the issue because the grievance was not based on any specific contract language, rendering it 
contractually inarbitrable. 
80. 173 Conn. I, 376 A.2d 399 (1977). 
81. Id. at 7, 376 A.2d at 403, quoting Wa"ior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 583. 
82. Id. at 14, 376 A.2d at 406. 
83. 51 Or. App. 321, 625 P.2d 1336 (1981). 
84. Id. at 324-26, 625 P.2d at 1338-39. 
85. See Snow, supra note 68, at 464-69 for a criticism of the case and others in which the courts 
and the ERB become involved in the merits of the dispute in determining arbitrability. 
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ogy, other courts have explicitly found the Trilogy presumption of arbi-
trability inappropriate. In Acting Superintendent of Schools of Liverpool 
Central School District v. United Liverpool Faculty Association, 86 the New 
York Court of Appeals found the policy favoring arbitration in the pri-
vate sector inapplicable to the public sector because of the lack of both 
widespread acceptance and demonstrated efficacy of arbitration. Thus, 
the court inferred that the parties intended the arbitration clause to have 
a narrow scope "in the absence of clear, unequivocal agreement to the 
contrary."87 Despite purporting to apply the Liverpool rule, however, 
New York courts, including the Court of Appeals, frequently have or-
dered arbitration and affirmed arbitration awards challenged on the basis 
of lack of arbitrability. 88 Like the Trilogy principles, the Liverpool rule 
often has been honored in the breach. 
2. Legal Arbitrability 
Legal arbitrability claims, unlike contractual arbitrability claims, 
are relatively unique to the public sector.89 The legal arbitrability argu-
ment is based on the theory that the parties could not lawfully agree to 
arbitrate the contested issue, and therefore, the court cannot order arbi-
tration or, if arbitration has occurred, cannot enforce the award.90 Most 
legal arbitrability claims are based on the nondelegability theory, i.e., 
that the government cannot delegate its powers to an outside authority.91 
While the theory has passed its zenith, it still operates to preclude arbi-
tration of certain subjects, either because the legislature has expressly 
excluded those subjects from arbitration92 or because the court interprets 
86. 42 N.Y.2d 509, 369 N.E.2d 746, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1977). 
87. Id. at 514, 369 N.E.2d at 749, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 190. See also Service Employees Int'I 
Union, Local 614 v. County of Napa, 99 Cal. App. 3d 946, 160 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1979) where the 
California Appellate Court held that the employer was not required to arbitrate a dispute over denial 
of merit increases, citing its "doubt" that the Steelworkers Trilogy principles applied to public sector 
agreements while holding that even if the principles applied, arbitration must be denied. 
88. Craver, supra note 10, at 337-38 and cases cited therein. 
89. See Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-6 to 60-8. 
90. Id. at 60-6 to 60-8, 60-10 to 60-11. 
91. See, e.g., Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 
878, 390 N. Y.S.2d 53 (1976) (board of education cannot give up the authority to make tenure deter-
minations); Paterson Police PBA, Local No. Iv. City of Paterson, 87 N.J. 78, 432 A.2d 847 (1981) 
(award vacated because as a general rule, a public employer may not relinquish any of its managerial 
prerogatives); State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 393 A.2d 233 (1978) (coun 
reversed PERC's decision in a scope of negotiations determination as a public employer may not 
bind the discretion of the Civil Service Commission). The nondelegability argument may contest the 
authority of the public employer to delegate decisionmaking authority to an arbitrator or the author-
ity of the employer to limit its discretionary power by the provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Perkovich & Stein, Challenges to Arbitration under Illinois Public Sector Labor Relations 
Statutes, 7 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 191, 198 (1989). 
92. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 34:13A-5.3 (1990) (collective bargaining agreement can-
1990] THE PUBLIC SECTOR 647 
the legislative enactments to restrict delegation.93 
In the latter category, disputes involving tenure for teachers are fre-
quently the subject of nondelegability arguments. The New York Court 
of Appeals in Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Association 94 
held that the Board of Education could not relinquish the responsibility 
to make tenure decisions. 95 Therefore, the court refused to enforce an 
arbitration award that reinstated a probationary teacher discharged with-
out just cause, a remedy which would confer tenure on the teacher by 
operation of the statute.96 Nevertheless, the court found that the school 
board could negotiate supplemental procedural steps to be followed prior 
to a tenure decision and the arbitrator could order reinstatement without 
tenure for an additional year as a remedy for failure to follow such 
procedures. 
Legal arbitrability issues are intertwined inextricably with issues of 
negotiability. Many of the decisions on arbitrability in the public sector 
tum on the question of whether the subject of the arbitration is negotia- . 
ble.97 Some courts have held, however, that once the employer has nego-
tiated about a subject, it must arbitrate issues relating to that subject, 
regardless of whether it had the authority to negotiate about the subject 
not provide for binding arbitration of disputes involving discipline of employees with statutory ten-
ure or civil service protection). 
93. See, e.g., cases cited supra at note 91. This interpretation may be based on limitations 
regarding negotiability. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
94. Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390 
N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976). 
95. Accord Lake County Educ. Ass'n v. School Bd. of Lake County, 360 So. 2d 1280, 1285 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 882 (Fla. I 978)("[i]t is the public policy of Florida as 
expressed by statute that our elected school boards shall have the exclusive prerogative to decide 
whether to reappoint nontenured teachers.") Cf Ferndale Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 67 Mich. 
App. 637, 242 N.W.2d 478 (1976)(court upheld arbitrator's award reinstating probationary teacher 
for violation of provisions of Teachers Tenure Act incorporated by reference in collective bargaining 
agreement, although reinstatement had the effect of awarding tenure by operation of statute.) But 
see Brown v. Holton Pub. Schools, 401 Mich. 398, 258 N.W.2d 51 (1977) where the court found that 
there was no contractual basis on which to arbitrate a probationary teacher's grievance based on 
nonrenewal, thereby avoiding the necessity of ruling on the question of legal arbitrability. 
96. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2509 (McKinney 1981) grants the school board the sole authority to 
confer tenure on those persons who have been found competent, efficient and satisfactory at the end 
of the probationary period. Yet persons who have served the full probationary period and continue 
to teach are entitled by statute to retain their positions absent just cause for removal, which confers 
tenure without confirmation by the school board. Cohoes, 40 N.Y.2d at 779, 358 N.E.2d at 881, 390 
N.Y.S.2d at 56. Thus, if the court confirmed the arbitrator's award reinstating the teacher in 
Cohoes, the teacher would be tenured by virtue of continuing to teach beyond expiration of the 
probationary period. Id. at 777, 358 N.E.2d at 879, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 54. 
97. See, e.g., Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 161, 393 
A.2d 278, 286 (1978). For a critical discussion of the role that scope of bargaining determinations 
play in arbitrability determinations, see Toole, Judicial Activism in Public Sector Grievance Arbitra-
tion: A Study of Recent Developments, 33 ARB. J. 6 (Sept. 1978). 
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in the first instance. 98 In addition, where there is a category of permis-
sive subjects for negotiation, as in the private sector,99 the fact that a 
grievance does not concern a mandatory bargaining subject may not be 
dispositive of the arbitrability issue. Several courts have held that once 
the employer has chosen to negotiate about a permissive subject, it must 
arbitrate grievances alleging violations of the provisions of the agreement 
relating to permissive subjects of bargaining. 100 
B. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards in the Public Sector 
Typically, judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to grounds 
specified in the state's Uniform Arbitration Act101 and to legal challenges 
98. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 66, 
74, 391 A.2d 1318, 1322 (1978). (''To permit an employer to enter into agreements and include 
terms such as grievance arbitration which raise the expectations of those concerned, and then to 
subsequently refuse to abide by those provisions on the basis of its lack of capacity would invite 
discord and distrust and create an atmosphere wherein a harmonious relationship would virtually be 
impossible to maintain.") 
99. See NLRB v. Wooster Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) in which the court 
defines three categories of bargaining subjects under the National Labor Relations Act, mandatory, 
permissive, and illegal. The parties are free to bargain about permissive subjects if they choose to do 
so and, if agreement is reached, the resulting contract is enforceable. Id. at 349. 
JOO. See, e.g., Iowa City Community School Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 139, 
141 (Iowa 1983) (grievance over denial of salary increase for unsatisfactory performance arbitrable 
since "restrictive interpretation of mandatory bargaining topics does not inhibit voluntary bargain-
ing and agreement on permissive topics"); Susquehanna Valley Central School Dist. v. Susquehanna 
Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975) (employer that 
voluntarily bargained about staff size, a nonmandatory subject of bargaining, was required to arbi-
trate a grievance over a staff reduction.) The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, in Paterson 
Police PBA Local No. Iv. City of Paterson, 87 N.J. 78, 432 A.2d 847 (1981), narrowed the scope of 
permissive subjects in denying enforcement of arbitration awards finding violations of the promotion 
clause of the collective bargaining agreement. The court stated that no issue is permissively negotia-
ble unless it leaves the government's policymaking powers "essentially unfettered." Id. at 93, 432 
A.2d at 854. The court further cautioned PERC that "the category of permissive subjects we have 
delineated is not broad." Id. According to the court, the narrow definition was necessary to ensure 
that bargaining did not "defeat the public's right to participate in the making of governmental pol-
icy, or to bypass the predominant duty of public employers to promote the public welfare." Id. at 
93, 432 A.2d at 854-55. Clearly, the court's decision was motivated by the same view of public 
policy which led the court to construe narrowly the scope of bargaining under the New Jersey Em-
ployer-Employee Relations Act and to hold that there is no classification of permissive bargaining 
subjects under that statute. See State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 393 A.2d 
233 (1978) and Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 
278 (1978). The Paterson case dealt with the existence of a permissive category of subjects for police 
and firefighters who are covered by distinct statutory provisions which expressly refer to permissive 
subjects. See Paterson, 87 N.J. at 87, 432 A.2d at 851; Ridgefield Park, 78 N.J. at 158, 393 A.2d at 
284. For a thorough discussion of Ridgefield Park and State Supervisory Employees, see Comment, 
After Ridgefield Park and State Supervisory Employees: The Scope of Collective Negotiations in the 
Public Sector of New Jersey, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 558 (1980). 
IOI. Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-32. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of the Findlay 
City School Dist. v. Findlay Educ. Ass'n, 49 Ohio St. 3d 129, 551 N.E.2d 186 (1990) (court upheld 
award of restoration rights to former teacher based on OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.10 (Anderson 
1981) which permits a court to vacate an award only for fraud or misconduct or if the arbitrator 
exceeded his or her authority); Port Authority of Allegheny County v. Amalgamated Transit 
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to either arbitrability, as discussed previously, or to the legality of the 
award. The most commonly invoked statutory ground for review of 
awards is the claim that the arbitrator exceeded the contractual limita-
tions on the authority of the arbitrator. In deciding such issues, many 
courts have relied on the Trilogy standard derived from Enterprise 
Wheel, 102 either in interpreting the Arbitration Act103 or as an independ-
ent standard of review. 104 
Although most courts, in accordance with the Enterprise Wheel 
standard, 105 purport to eschew review of arbitration awards on the mer-
its, some courts have engaged in merits review in the guise of determin-
Union, Div. 85, 492 Pa. 494, 424 A.2d 1299 (1981) (42 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 7314 (Purdon 
1989)), patterned after the Arbitration Act of 1927, allowed an award to be vacated only for a 
showing of fraud or misconduct, or if the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority, so the court 
upheld the award which granted benefits to injured employees). See a/S-0 Uniform Arbitration Act, 
MINN. STAT. §§ 572.08-.30 (1988). 
102. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). (The 
award is legitimate so long as it "draws its essence" from the agreement.) 
103. See, e.g., Port Authority of Allegheny County v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 492 Pa. 494, 
424 A.2d 1299 (1981); Community College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver 
County, Society of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977). 
104. See, e.g., City of Des Moines v. Central Iowa Pub. Employees Council, 369 N.W.2d 442 
(Iowa 1985), aff'd, 439 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1989); Iowa City Community School Dist. v. Iowa City 
Educ. Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa S. Ct. 1983); Ferndale Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 67 Mich. 
App. 637, 242 N.W.2d 478 (1976). In states in which awards are reviewed initially by the adminis-
trative agency rather than the courts, the standards of review applied are similar to those under the 
Uniform Arbitration Acts and the Trilogy. See Snow, supra note 68, at 473-80. (Oregon uses the test 
first articulated in Willamina Educ. Ass'n v. Willamina School Dist. No. 30-44-631, 4 P.E.C.B.R. 
2571 (1980), remanded, SO Or. App. 195, 623 P.2d 658 (1981), aff'd on rehearing after remand, 60 
Or. App. 629, 655 P.2d 189 (1982), which "established that an award would be discarded ifit was 
clear l) that the parties had not contractually agreed to accept the award as final and binding or 2) 
that enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy." Snow, supra note 68, at 474. 
This test resembles the Trilogy standard and has resulted in challenges based on allegations that 
arbitral authority was exceeded or that public policy was violated by the award.). In Board of Educ. 
of Danville Comm. Cons. School Dist. No. 118 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 175 Ill. App. 
3d 347, 353, 529 N.E.2d 1110, 1114 (4th Dist. 1988), cert. denied, 124 Ill. 2d 553, 535 N.E.2d 912 
(1989), the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed a decision by the Illinois Educational Labor Relations 
Board ("IELRB") finding that an employer committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to com-
ply with an arbitration award which was valid since there was "no evidence of fraud, dishonesty or 
serious error" and "the arbitrator was at least arguably acting within the scope of his authority." 
The IELRB has exclusive jurisdiction to review arbitration awards under the Illinois Educational 
Labor Relations Act. Bd. of Educ. of Community School Dist. No. l v. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d 216, 
526 N.E.2d 149 (1988). 
105. See, e.g., AFSCME v. State, 158 Ill. App. 3d 584, 588, 511 N.E.2d 749, 751 (1987), aff'd, 
124 lll. 2d 246, 529 N.E.2d 534 (1988) (award which reduced discipline of employee from discharge 
to suspension was reinstated, as an award is not subject to review on the merits), Ferndale, 67 Mich. 
App. at 643, 242 N.W.2d at 480 (Trilogy theory that the merits of an award are irrelevant in subse-
quent review was adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court in Frazier v. Ford Motor Co., 364 Mich. 
648, 112 N.W.2d 80 (1961)); Metropolitan Airports Comm'n v. Metropolitan Airports Police Fed'n, 
443 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Minn. 1989) (arbitrator is the judge as to the facts and law, and award cannot 
be vacated if it draws its essence from the contract); Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.l. 907, 912, 391 A.2d 
1173, 1176 (1978) (as long as the award draws its essence from the contract, it is within the arbitra-
tor's authority and the court's review must end). 
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ing whether the arbitrator exceeded contractual authority. 106 In Board 
of Education of the City of New Haven v. AFSCME Council 4, 107 the 
court reviewed an arbitration award that reinstated an employee because 
the employer violated the contract by the manner in which it served the 
notice of termination. The arbitration panel's decision relied on a stipu-
lated arbitration award in another case, which was introduced into evi-
dence. The court, while quoting Enterprise Wheel, found that the panel 
exceeded its authority by relying on a document that was not a part of 
the contract. In a strong dissent, Justice Parsky pointed out that the 
stipulated award was the parties' interpretation of the agreement and 
therefore, a legitimate basis for the arbitration award. 108 Similarly, in 
State of Connecticut v. AFSCME Council 4, 109 the court vacated an arbi-
tration award on the basis that it was inherently inconsistent with the 
agreement. Again, while purporting to apply Trilogy principles, the 
court interpreted the agreement differently than the arbitrator and on 
that basis, overturned the award. 110 
106. Such an approach is not unique to the public sector although it may be more common 
there. Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers Union, Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966) is 
frequently criticized as a case in which the court did precisely that. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 
28, at 1152-53. In Torrington, the arbitrator sustained the union's grievance which alleged that the 
employer breached the contract by unilaterally eliminating a long-standing practice of paying em-
ployees for one hour to vote on Election Day. The court refused to enforce the award, stating that 
by relying on past practice where there was no language in the collective bargaining agreement, the 
arbitrator added to the agreement in violation of the common contractual reservation on the arbitra-
tor's powers which prohibits adding to, modifying or altering the agreement. As ably stated by 
Professor St. Antoine, "any time a court is incensed enough with an arbitrator's reading of the 
contract ... , it is simplicity itself to conclude that the arbitrator must have 'added to or altered' the 
collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 1153. 
107. 195 Conn. 266, 487 A.2d 553 (1985). 
108. Id. at 274, 487 A.2d at 557. The Connecticut Supreme Court's ruling is analogous to the 
decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Torrington. See supra note 106. Cf Ramsey 
County v. AFSCME Council 91, 309 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1981) where the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota held that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers in issuing an award based on past practice 
despite the fact that the past practice conflicted with the contract language. The Ramsey court 
applied the "essence" test, recognizing that the contract is not the sole evidence of the parties intent. 
In contrast to the Connecticut Supreme Court in New Haven, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated 
that "the concept of judicial deference to arbitral authority must encompass the recognition that the 
arbitrator is the reader of the contract. As the parties' chosen 'reader', he is authorized to consider 
matters outside the written agreement in resolving disputes arising out of the continuing employ-
ment relationship." Id. at 793. The dissent in Ramsey strongly argued that the arbitrator exceeded 
his authority by using past practice to modify the unambiguous provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Id. at 795 (Peterson, J., dissenting). 
109. 13 Conn. App. 461, 537 A.2d 517 (1988). 
110. The arbitrator in this case decided an issue of arbitrability, which may have contributed to 
the court's more intrusive review. Nevertheless, the court cited Enterprise Wheel and purported to 
apply the Enterprise standard. Id. at 467, 537 A.2d at 520. The court further justified its decision by 
asserting that the award conflicted with public policy because it allowed a probationary employee to 
grieve her dismissal by finding that she had completed the working test period because her time as a 
provisional employee was part of the working test period. According to the court such a conclusion 
was contrary to civil service law which limited appointment to employees determined by examina-
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Connecticut courts are not the only courts that engage in merits 
review of the public sector arbitrator's determination. The New Jersey 
courts explicitly apply a different standard of contract review in the pub-
lic sector, i.e., "whether the interpretation of the contractual language is 
reasonably debatable." 111 In State of New Jersey v. State Troopers Frater-
nal Association, 112 the collective bargaining agreement provided for the 
employees to participate in a prescription drug program which required a 
co-payment of $1.25 for each prescription. During the term of the agree-
ment the legislature appropriated funds for the prescription drug pro-
gram based on a co-payment of $2.50, which prompted the employer to 
change the co-payment for the employees covered by the contract. 113 
Based on language in the agreement stating that the employer "shall pro-
vide" the funds necessary to maintain the program, the arbitrator found 
that the change in the co-payment violated the agreement. The court 
ruled that a separate section of the contract, which stated that all terms 
of the agreement were subject to legislative changes, controlled all con-
tract clauses, and held that the arbitrator's interpretation was not reason-
ably debatable. The opinion suggests that the court's beliefs that co-
payment plans are reflective of an important governmental policy of cost 
sharing and that benefits for all employees should be uniform for ease of 
administration, significantly influenced its decision. 114 Like the Connect-
icut courts, the New Jersey Supreme Court, ignoring the Trilogy princi-
ples, found a rationale to justify overturning an arbitration award with 
which it disagreed.us Notably, while the attack on the award in State 
tion and working test period to be fit and competent. Id. See infra notes 125-61 and accompanying 
text, for further discussion of the public policy exception. 
111. See State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, 91 N.J. 464, 468-69, 4S3 A.2d 176, 178-79 
(1982). 
112. 91 N.J. 464, 4S3 A.2d 176 (1982). 
113. Id. at 466, 4S3 A.2d at 177. 
114. Id. at 470, 4S3 A.2d at 180. 
11S. See also Musser v. County of Centre, IOI Pa. Commw. 193, SIS A.2d 1027 (1986), aff'd, 
Sl3 Pa. 380, 548 A.2d 1194 (1988) where the court reversed the arbitrator's determination that there 
was no just cause to discharge two prison guards who abused a prisoner because the type of abuse in 
which they engaged had long been tolerated by prison officials without discipline. Despite the fact 
that arbitrators commonly rely on such condonation to reverse discharge actions, see F. ELKOURI & 
E. A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 683-84 (4th ed. l98S), the court, which was justifiably 
outraged by the grievants' conduct, found that the arbitrator's award did not draw its essence from 
the agreement because he found just cause for discipline, but not discharge, and reduced the penalty 
to a suspension. Had the court followed the Trilogy as it purported to do, it would not have over-
turned the award .. While the court suggested that the arbitrator imposed "his own brand of indus-
trial justice" contrary to the limitation of Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596, in fact, the court 
substituted its brand of industrial justice for the arbitrator's award. See Jones, 'His Own Brand of 
Industrial Justice': The Stalking Horse of Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
881 (1983) where the author, a distinguished arbitrator, suggests that the parties to a contract bar-
gain for arbitrator's brand of industrial justice, and thus, application of industrial justice by the 
arbitrtor is not grounds for setting aside awards. 
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Troopers was not based expressly on public policy, the court appeared to 
be influenced by perceived public policy considerations in overturning 
the award. 
Public sector courts, like courts in the private sector, 116 occasionally 
set aside awards based on the common contractual restriction that arbi-
trators cannot add to, subtract from, or modify the contract. 117 Employ-
ers have used this limitation to overturn awards reinstating discharged 
employees. For example, in Board of Control of Ferris State College v. 
Michigan AFSCME, Council 25, 118 the arbitrator relied on the grievant's 
remorse for hitting his supervisor and his promise not to repeat the viola-
tion to reduce the discharge to a suspension. The court found that the 
arbitrator improperly modified the agreement because he found just 
cause for discharge, but reinstated the employee. Similarly, the arbitra-
tor in County College of Morris Staff Association v. County College of 
Morris 119 stated that just cause for dismissal existed, but because the em-
ployer failed to use progressive discipline, which was a prerequisite to 
discharge, the employer was required to reinstate the employee. Despite 
the fact that arbitrators frequently interpret just cause to require progres-
sive discipline, the court found that the arbitrator added to the contract 
by requiring progressive discipline. 120 
116. See supra note 106; Morgan Services, Inc. v. Local 323, Chicago & Cent. States Joint Bel., 
724 F.2d 1217, 1222 and n.8 (6th Cir. 1984). The court in Morgan vacated the arbitrator's award 
reinstating an employee, finding that the arbitrator modified unambiguous language in the agreement 
when he reduced a discharge to a suspension. In the court's view, the agreement clearly gave the 
employer the right to determine the appropriate sanction for insubordination. 
117. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy: A Celebration, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD ANN. MEET· 
ING OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 331, 364 (1981). 
118. 138 Mich. App. 170, 361 N.W.2d 342 (1984). 
119. 100 N.J. 383, 495 A.2d 865 (1985). 
120. See ELKOURI AND ELKOURI, supra note 115, at 653-54. See also City of Hartford v. Local 
760, lnt'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 6 Conn. App. 11, 502 A.2d 429 (1986) (The Connecticut Appellate 
Court reversed an arbitration board award where the board found that the grievant was suspended 
for just cause, but reduced the period of suspension. The court held that the board exceeded the 
scope of the submission to arbitration by addressing the question of the remedy after finding just 
cause); State v. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Local No. 79, 544 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1988) (The 
arbitrator exceeded authority by reducing termination to suspension. Where the agreement allowed 
the employer to discharge for just cause and the arbitrator found that just cause for discipline ex-
isted, the arbitrator could not reduce the penalty to a suspension.). Contra Drivers Union Local 695 
v. County of Sauk, 103 Wis. 2d 691, 310 N.W.2d 652 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (arbitrator's award which 
found good cause for discipline but overturned the discharge of an employee where progressive 
discipline and a predischarge interview were not provided, was upheld against a challenge that arbi-
trator exceeded authority and violated public policy). 
Employees have asserted the same semantic argument in reverse. See McDonald v. Hardee 
County School Bd., 448 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 456 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1984). 
The arbitrator sustained a teacher's grievance because the employer did not comply with predis-
charge procedures, and reduced the discharge to a suspension. The court rejected the employee's 
argument that it must vacate the award as to suspension and reinstate the employee with full back 
pay because the arbitrator's award stated that the grievance was sustained. McDonald, 448 So. 2d at 
593. 
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The courts in these cases interpreted the arbitration awards as hold-
ing that just cause for discharge existed, but nevertheless reducing the 
penalty imposed by the employer. Consequently, the courts vacated the 
awards on the ground that the arbitrators exceeded contractual author-
ity. Each of the awards is also susceptible to an interpretation which 
would warrant upholding the award, however, since each could be read 
to hold that while the actions of the employee normally would provide 
just cause for discharge, in the circumstances of the case, just cause did 
not exist. 121 Thus, at most there is an ambiguity in the language of the 
arbitration awards that might suggest that the arbitrator exceeded con-
tractual authority. Had the courts followed the dictates of Enterprise 
Wheel, 122 they would have enforced rather than vacated the awards. In 
Enterprise Wheel, the Court emphasized the importance of relying on the 
arbitrator's informed judgment in the formulation of remedies because of 
the need for ftexibility. 123 The Court further cautioned that ambiguity in 
the opinion that would allow an inference that the arbitrator may have 
exceeded contractual authority does not justify a refusal to enforce the 
award. 124 Accordingly, in light of the policy favoring arbitration, courts 
121. As ably stated by the dissenting justice in County College of Morris: 
The majority is obviously convinced that this employee should have been fired. What 
the majority has forgotten is that when the employer and the employees' association agreed 
upon arbitration of the wrongful discharge issue, it was the arbitrator's conclusion that 
became important and the court's conviction irrelevant. 
The majority finds that the arbitrator decided that there was "just cause" for dis-
charge and that the issue, therefore, is whether the arbitrator, having found "just cause" 
has the power, despite that finding, to deprive the employer of its consequent clear right to 
discharge the employee. One would think the Court would hesitate to attribute to a pre-
sumably experienced, intelligent, and impartial arbitrator such a ludicrous decision, 
namely, that even though he found the employer had "just cause" to discharge plaintilf, 
and even though the contract explicitly allowed discharge under such circumstances, the 
employer nevertheless could not discharge this employee. 
That is not, however, what the arbitrator found. A fair, common sense, reading of his 
opinion is that he found that ordinarily ("normally") this employee's conduct would con-
stitute "just cause" for discharge, but given the particular circumstances surrounding that 
conduct, including the employer's accompanying acts, "just cause" did not exist. 
County College of Morris, 495 A.2d at 873-74. (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting). 
After discussing the court's interpretation of the award, Chief Justice Wilentz went on to say: 
This interpretation by the Court drains the arbitrator's opinion of its true meaning and, 
having thus drained it, the Court can go on to conclude that the arbitrator's award does 
not "draw its essence from the parties' agreement." 
Id. at 874. 
122. Notably, several of these courts purported to rely on the Trilogy. See Board of Control, 138 
Mich. App. at 173-74, 361 N.W.2d at 343-44; National Ass'n ofGov't Employees v. State of Rhode 
Island, 544 A.2d at 119. 
123. The Supreme Court recently reemphasized the importance of arbitral flexibility with re-
spect to remedies in United Paperworkers Int'! Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 41 (1987). 
124. 363 U.S. at 598. As noted by the Court, arbitrators have no obligation to write opinions 
and to require the absence of ambiguity for enforcement might discourage written opinions, which 
would be detrimental to the arbitration process. Id. Despite this clear direction from the Supreme 
Court, the court decisions in Board of Control, County College of Morris, and other cases cited at 
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should decline the invitation to interpret ambiguous awards to conflict 
with the authority of the arbitrator and, in accord with Enterprise Wheel, 
enforce the awards so long as they are susceptible to an interpretation 
which is consistent with the arbitrator's authority. 
C. Public Policy Challenges to Arbitration Awards 
In addition to reviewing awards based on the contract, courts fre-
quently are faced with public policy challenges to arbitration awards. 
The arbitrability arguments discussed previously are a form of public 
policy argument, for the theory of legal inarbitrability is analogous to the 
public policy exception recognized by the Supreme Court in W.R. Grace 
and Misco, i.e., public policy as expressed by statutory or constitutional 
law prohibits arbitration of the issue. The Misco public policy exception 
is broader than the legal inarbitrability theory, however, because it allows 
a court to invalidate an arbitration award which violates public policy 
even where arbitration of the issue was legally permitted. As in the pri-
vate sector, 125 cases in the public sector reflect a range of views on the 
scope of the public policy exception. Some courts have applied a narrow 
public policy exception, 126 some have applied a broad public policy ex-
ception, 127 and others, like the United States Supreme Court in Misco, 
have avoided deciding the scope of the exception. 
1. The Narrow Public Policy Exception 
Public sector employers,· like employers under the National Labor 
Relations Act, 128 have urged that arbitration awards reinstating dis-
note 120, supra, suggest that arbitrators should write their opinions with care for the language cho-
sen may determine the enforceability of the award. Arbitrators should avoid language that suggests 
that just cause for discipline exists when the decision alters the penalty imposed by management. 
125. See supra notes 4-7, 42-62 and accompanying text. 
126. The narrow public policy exception invalidates only awards that violate positive law or 
require the employer to violate positive law. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. For further 
discussion of the narrow exception in the public sector, see infra notes 128-54 and accompanying 
text. 
127. The broad public policy exception invalidates awards that conflict with policies underlying 
statutory or decisional law although the award itself neither violates the law nor requires the em-
ployer to violate the law. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the 
broad exception, see infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. The Postal Service is covered by the National 
Labor Relations Act although it is a public employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 1209(a) (1988); Respondent's 
memorandum at 4, United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1988) (87-89). The Postal Service has argued in several 
cases that arbitration awards reinstating discharged employees should be overturned based on the 
public policy exception to the Trilogy. See United States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers 
Union, 736 F.2d 822, 825 (1st Cir. 1984) (award requiring Postal Service to reinstate employee 
convicted of embezzling postal funds was vacated because the public policy concerns were not only 
defined by positive law, but were also the clear dictates of common sense); American Postal Workers 
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charged employees be overturned on public policy grounds. 129 In 
AFSCME v. State of Illinois, 130 two employees of a residential center for 
the disabled were terminated for patient mistreatment after a patient died 
while they were absent from the facility without authorization. The arbi-
trator found insufficient cause for discharge because the employees had 
excellent work records and there was no relationship between their ab-
sence and the death of the patient, who was on a different wing from the 
one in which the employees worked. The employer challenged the 
award, arguing that it was against public policy to reinstate employees 
who engaged in mistreatment of patients. While recognizing an impor-
tant public policy against mistreatment of the mentally disabled, the 
court found that 
[t]here is simply no public policy that mandates the discharge of all 
employees found guilty of mistreatment of a service recipient when the 
arbitrator expressly finds that the grievants were exemplary mental 
health employees, when punishment has been imposed, and where no 
nexis [sic] exists between the infraction and the patient's tragic 
death. 131 
While AFSCME exemplifies a relatively narrow reading of the pub-
lic policy exception, the opinion suggests that the decision may be fact 
specific. The court noted that the misconduct of the employees did not 
involve abuse of, or injury to, any residents, intimating that reinstate-
ment of an employee who engaged in such conduct might be set aside, 
despite the absence of any legal prohibition on employing an individual 
who mistreated a resident.132 
In another public policy discharge case, Binghamton Civil Service 
Union v. United States Postal Service, 682 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1982), cen. denied, 459 U.S. 
1200 (1983) (since it is unlawful for an individual to hold a government position once that person has 
participated in a strike against the government, arbitrator's award reinstating a postal worker who 
participated in a strike was vacated). The Postal Service has urged adoption of a broad public policy 
exception to enforcement of arbitration awards for the public sector. Brief for the United States 
Postal Service at 8, United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239 
(D.C. Cir.), cen. dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1987) (87-89). 
129. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen, Local 540 v. Great Western 
Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.), reh'g. denied, 717 F.2d 1399 (5th Cir. 1983) (award reinstating 
truck driver who had wrecked a company rig and was cited by the police for drunk driving was 
vacated as against public policy) and cases cited supra, at note 49. 
130. 124 Ill. 2d 246, 529 N.E.2d 534 (1988). 
131. Id. at 264, 529 N.E.2d at 541. The court reversed the lower court which had set aside the 
arbitrator's award on public policy grounds. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text. 
132. The court was also careful to distinguish the case factually from Board of Trustees of Com-
munity College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 74 Ill. 2d 412, 386 N.E.2d 47 
(1979), in which it had vacated an award on the basis that the decision rewarded illegal strikers at 
the expense of nonstrikers by requiring the employer to count time worked during the strike as extra 
time worked for priority in the assignment of summer employment. In that decision, the same court 
had employed a broad view of public policy, vacating the award despite the absence of any legal 
prohibition against providing benefits to teachers who had engaged in an unlawful strike. 
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Forum v. City of Binghamton, 133 the arbitrator found insufficient cause 
for termination of a city building superintendent who had admitted ac-
cepting bribes. The arbitrator converted the discharge to a six month 
suspension. 134 New York law prohibited any municipal officer from ac-
cepting a gift where it could be inferred that the gift was intended to 
influence the officer in the performance of official duties. As noted by the 
court, however, the statute "[did] not inflexibly mandate the discharge of 
an employee in violation of its proscriptions." 13s Accordingly, the court 
found that the reinstatement did not violate public policy, stating: "[t]he 
fact that we may disagree with the wisdom and advisability of the arbi-
tration award, gives us no license, as a court of law, to impose what we 
may feel is a more appropriate remedy. The bargain, having been struck, 
must now be honored."136 
The approach of the New York Court of Appeals mirrors the nar-
row interpretation of public policy adopted by some private sector 
courts. 137 If the award does not contravene an explicit statute or consti-
tutional provision, then it will be upheld under this narrow reading of the 
exception. 138 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on a similar public policy ar-
gument to set aside an arbitrator's award in Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Commission v. Teamsters Local No. 563. 139 The arbitrator there 
found that the employer did not have just cause to terminate an em-
ployee for nonresidency, despite an ordinance which required employees 
to be city residents. The court found that the matter was not arbitrable 
133. 44 N.Y.2d 23, 374 N.E.2d 380, 403 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1978). 
134. Id. at 28, 374 N.E.2d at 381, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 483. 
135. Id. at 31, 374 N.E.2d at 383, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 485. 
136. Id. A strong dissent by Judge Wachtler asserted that the government has a responsibility to 
set a moral tone by maintaining the integrity of government and thus the arbitrator could not restrict 
the employer's power to discharge an employee for violation of the public trust. Id. at 30-32, 374 
N.E.2d at 383-84, 403 N.Y.S. at 485-86 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). 
137. See supra notes 7, 45 & 54 and accompanying text. 
138. Accord De Paulo v. City of Albany, 49 N.Y.2d 994, 995-96, 406 N.E.2d 1064, 1065-66, 429 
N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (1980) (arbitration award reinstating with suspension a police officer found guilty 
of releasing an impounded car without authority and filing a false report would not be set aside on 
public policy grounds where conviction was for disorderly conduct and statute required discharge 
for conviction of a felony or crime involving a violation of the oath of office). 
In Ford v. Civil Service Employees Ass'n, 94 A.D.2d 262, 464 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1983), motion/or 
leave to appeal dismissed, 68 N.Y.2d 782, 498 N.E.2d 148, 506 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1985), however, the 
court set aside an arbitrator's award reinstating an employee who induced a patient of the mental 
health facility in which he worked to have sexual intercourse with him. The court relied on the 
state's duty to protect the patients as expressed in various statutory provisions, as well as the crimi-
nal statutes defining sexual intercourse with a female who is incapable of consent as rape, to find that 
the award violated public policy. As in the two foregoing cases, however, there was no explicit 
statutory prohibition on continued employment of the grievant. 
139. 75 Wis. 2d 602, 250 N.W.2d 696 (1977). 
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because the contract provision was void as conflicting with the ordi-
nance. Although the majority found a direct conflict with the ordinance, 
the dissent, citing the Trilogy and relying on the public policy favoring 
arbitration, argued that the award did not violate public policy since the 
ordinance authorized exceptions to the residency requirement and both 
the ordinance and the agreement were adopted by the city council. Ac-
cordingly, the dissent argued, the arbitrator interpreted the agreement to 
give effect to both by ruling that nonresidency was just cause for dis-
charge only if it related to job performance. Thus, the majority should 
have upheld the award. 140 The majority opinion can be read as a narrow 
application of the public policy exception, 141 but the dissent points out 
the importance of the court's interpretation of the statute that forms the 
basis of the public policy argument. 142 If the court gives weight to the 
public policy in favor of arbitration in deciding whether the arbitration 
award is unlawful, it may be able to accommodate the award and the 
allegedly conflicting statute. 143 
Two recent cases from the Connecticut Supreme Court further illus-
trate the narrow view of the public policy exception. In Watertown Police 
140. Id. at 620-24, 250 N.W.2d at 705 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). Indeed, eleven years later, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court was faced with another challenge to an arbitration award based on the 
allegedly conflicting ordinance requiring residency for city employees. See City of Madison v. 
Madison Professional Police Officers Ass'n, 144 Wis. 2d 576, 425 N.W.2d 8 (1988). The arbitrator 
there held that a union contract which exempted bus system employees from the residency require-
ment triggered a "me too" clause in the police officers' contract which exempted them from the 
requirement also. The court refused to set aside the award, finding no manifest disregard of the law, 
particularly in light of the fact that the city had agreed to the "me too" clause which expressly 
contemplated exceptions to the ordinance. Id. at 594, 425 N.W.2d at 14-15. In addressing WERC v. 
Teamsters, the court held that it was overruled to the extent that it could be understood to set forth a 
broad rule that ordinances always control over conflicting contracts. Id. at 595, 425 N.W.2d at 15. 
The court also distinguished WERC v. Teamsters on the facts. Id. at 590, 425 N.W.2d at 13. 
141. The majority purports to invalidate the award on the ground that the award required the 
employer to violate the law. 75 Wis. 2d at 612-13, 250 N.W.2d at 701. 
142. See id. at 621, 250 N.W.2d at 705. 
143. The California Supreme Court upheld an arbitration award in a discharge case against 
claims that the city charter, which gave the city manager power to discipline and remove employees 
subject to an appeal to the personnel board, prohibited arbitration. The court construed the city 
charter to permit the city manager to agree to arbitral review of disciplinary decisions and to allow 
arbitration as an alternative to civil service appeal, harmonizing the city charter with the public 
policy favoring arbitration. See Taylor v. Crane, 24 Cal. 3d 442, 595 P.2d 129, 155 Cal. Rptr. 695 
(1979). See also Social Services Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Training and Employment 
Bel., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1458, 255 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1989) where the court reviewed an arbitration 
award holding that the employer must offer a job to the grievant because it failed to give considera-
tion for promotion to current employees before hiring a nonemployee. While recognizing a strong 
public policy that a government agency has the right to administer its own civil service system and 
make discretionary promotion decisions, the court found that the discretion must be exercised in 
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement which, consistent with the policy favoring ne-
gotiations, superseded conflicting agency rules. Accordingly, the remedy did not violate public pol-
icy. Id. at 1465, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 745-50. 
6S8 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW (Vol. 66:631 
Union, Local 541 v. Town of Watertown, 144 the union challenged an arbi-
tration award upholding the discharge of a probationary police officer for 
violating an order prohibiting him from making traffic stops. The union 
argued that peace officers had a duty to protect the citizens of the com-
munity, based on a Connecticut statute stating that they "shall arrest" 
without a warrant any person committing a crime within their jurisdic-
tion.145 Therefore, the order to refrain from motor vehicle stops, which 
formed the basis for the employee's discharge, violated public policy. 
The court held that the statute applied to serious crimes, not to traffic 
violations, and further found no statute creating a duty to stop and inves-
tigate every violator of traffic laws. Indeed, the court observed that po-
lice departments with limited resources lawfully could adopt a policy of 
selective enforcement of minor traffic violations. Citing Misco, the court 
found that the award did not contravene any "well-defined and domi-
nant" public policy "ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal 
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public inter-
ests.' " 146 A broader view of public policy, however, could support over-
turning the award, for certainly a court could find that an order to a 
police officer to avoid enforcement of traffic laws violated public pol-
icy.147 The court's decision in Watertown is defensible on another 
ground, however. Under the narrow view of public policy, the award, 
rather than the conduct that leads to the grievance, must violate public 
policy. 148 The union argued that the discharge violated public policy, 
which is insufficient to warrant vacating the award under the narrow 
public policy exception. 
Similarly, in City of New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15,149 the 
court refused to vacate an arbitrator's decision that awarded back pay to 
a police officer for the period between his termination for a criminal con-
viction and his reinstatement after the conviction was reversed on appeal. 
The city claimed that because the officer's dismissal was based on the 
statutory provision that an officer convicted of a violation "shall be dis-
144. 210 Conn. 333, SSS A.2d 406 (1989). 
14S. Id. at 341, SSS A.2d at 410. 
146. Id. at 340, SSS A.2d at 410 (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 
U.S. 29, 43 (1987)). 
147. The dissent in Watertown asserted that even under a narrow view of the public policy ex-
ception, the arbitration award should be set aside. 210 Conn. at 348-49, SSS A.2d at 413-414 (Hea-
ley, J., dissenting). 
148. See Edwards, supra note S7, at 18; Fraternal Order of Police v. Bensinger, 122 Mich. App. 
437, 448, 333 N.W.2d 73, 78 (1983); Interstate Brands Corp. v. Teamsters Local 13S, 909 F.2d 88S, 
893 (6th Cir. 1990). 
149. 208 Conn. 411, S44 A.2d 186 (1988). 
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honorably discharged," 150 an award of back pay for the period of dis-
charge violated public policy. Relying on the narrow scope of the public 
policy exception, the court found that there was no direct violation of the 
statute; further, the arbitrator's construction of that statute as not pre-
cluding a back pay award was reasonable. 151 "In the absence of a clear 
arbitral misreading of statutory mandates or other egregious arbitral vio-
lation of public policy, the city has failed to prove that the arbitral award 
should be vacated." 152 Despite the narrow construction of the public 
policy exception in these two cases, however, the court's language leaves 
open the possibility of vacating an award based on public policy where 
the award is not unlawful. 
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division considered a 
public policy challenge to an arbitration award based on asserted inter-
ference with the legislative and executive powers of the employer in 
County of Rockland Department of Social Services v. Rockland County 
Unit, Local 844. 153 The union argued that the contract provision obligat-
ing the county to maintain a working environment that served the "com-
fort, well-being and safety" of its employees required the employer to 
insure that sufficient personnel and county vehicles were available to 
transport clients. The arbitrator upheld the grievance and the county 
asked the court to vacate the award. Quoting the New York Court of 
Appeals, the court declined, stating, " 'arguably every controversy has at 
its core some issue requiring the application, or weighing, of policy con-
siderations' but the court will intervene for reasons of public policy only 
where a policy 'prohibit[s], in an absolute sense, particular matters being 
decided or certain relief being granted by an arbitrator.' " 154 
2. The Broad Public Policy Exception 
The broader view of public policy has been applied by several 
courts. In Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. 
Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, m the Illinois Supreme 
ISO. 208 Conn. at 413, 544 A.2d at 188 (quoting CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 29 (1967)). 
151. Id. at 417-19, 544 A.2d at 190-91. As in the Watertown case, the court, using a broader 
view of public policy could have held that where the statute directed discharge, it would violate 
public policy to pay the employee for the period of termination. Underlying the court's decision in 
this case may be a feeling that the city should have awaited the outcome of the appeal before making 
the discharge decision. 
152. 208 Conn. at 419, 544 A.2d at 191. 
153. 140 A.D.2d 441, 528 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1988). 
154. Id. at 443, 528 N.Y.S. 2d at 144 quoting In re Sprinzen, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 630, 631, 389 
N.E.2d 456, 459, 460, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977, 978 (1979). Under the broader public policy view, the 
court could have found that the award interfered with the county's budgetary and taxing authority. 
lSS. 74 Ill. 2d 412, 386 N.E.2d 47, 24 Ill. Dec. 843 (1979). 
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Court set aside an arbitration award as contrary to public policy where 
the impact of the award was to give priority in assignment of extra paid 
assignments to teachers who had participated in an illegal strike. 
Although the award drew its essence from the agreement and violated no 
statutory or constitutional provision, the court found it repugnant to 
public policy because it allowed the teachers to benefit from their unlaw-
ful strike. 156 In Board of Education, Great Neck Union Free School Dis-
trict v. Areman, 157 the New York Court of Appeals, citing public policy 
concerns, stayed arbitration of a grievance regarding a contractual provi-
sion that denied members of the Board of Education access to teacher 
personnel files. The court found that the duty to employ qualified teach-
ers and to make tenure decisions required the board to have access to 
personnel files and therefore, the board could not bargain away that 
right. Again there was no express statutory bar to such a provision and 
the board had not unlawfully delegated a duty exclusively committed to 
it by law. Nevertheless, the court relied on the statutory duty to employ 
and retain only qualified teachers to restrict the board's authority to ne-
gotiate contract provisions that the court believed affected the board's 
ability to perform that duty. Under a narrow view of public policy, both 
of these cases would have been decided differently. 
3. Avoiding the Issue of the Scope of the Exception 
The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in City of Hartford v. 
Connecticut State Board of Mediation and Arbitration, 158 provides an ex-
ample of a case where the court decided the public policy issue, but 
avoided determining the scope of the exception. There, the arbitration 
board found that the city violated the agreement by denying the grievants 
the opportunity to take an examination for promotion. As a remedy, the 
arbitrators ordered the city to administer the exam to both grievants, and 
to promote the more qualified of the two. The city argued that the rem-
edy violated the "rule of three" 159 which was a component of the merit 
selection process allowing the department head to choose any of the 
three most qualified candidates for promotion. Citing United 
Paperworkers v. Misco, the court found that the city did not show "the 
required nexus between the failure of the arbitrators to abide by the rule 
of three and a violation of the claimed public policy of merit selec-
156. Id. at 425-26, 386 N.E.2d at 53, 24 Ill. Dec. at 849. 
157. 41 N.Y.2d 527, 362 N.E.2d 943, 394 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1977). 
158. 211 Conn. 7, 557 A.2d 1236 (1989). 
159. See R. KEARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 185 (1984). 
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tion." 160 Indeed, the court felt that the policy of merit selection would be 
furthered by the arbitration award since inclusion of a third candidate 
would risk selection of that candidate on a basis unrelated to qualifica-
tions. Like Misco, the City of Hartford case gives no clear indication of 
the limits of public policy, but suggests that the court will scrutinize pub-
lic policy arguments carefully to insure that the award directly violates 
public policy. 161 
IV. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARDS FOR ARBITRATION 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The review of various judicial decisions in arbitration cases in the 
public sector illustrates that some courts apply the deferential standards 
from the private sector while others do not, even where purporting to do 
so. The question that must be addressed is whether differences between 
the private and public sectors require greater judicial involvement in ar-
bitration in the latter. Further, with respect to the public policy excep-
tion to arbitral deference, the issue is which of the two private sector 
standards is most appropriate for judicial review in the public sector. 
There are four primary arguments for a less deferential judicial ap-
proach to arbitration in the public sector. First, it is asserted that the 
limited history of arbitration in the public sector precludes an inference 
that the parties intended a broad arbitration clause. 162 Proponents of 
this argument assert that because arbitration has not been widely used in 
the public sector, it has neither the acceptability nor the demonstrated 
efficacy "as a means for resolving controversies in government employ-
ment." 163 Second, it is argued that arbitration in the public sector must 
be narrowly circumscribed by the courts to protect the public interest. 164 
Supporters of this argument note that public sector employers are re-
sponsible to voters, not stockholders. 165 Union demands in negotiations 
are not limited by market forces to the same degree as in the private 
sector. 166 Thus, the argument goes, decisionmaking authority must be 
exercised by those accountable to the public, which requires limiting col-
160. 211 Conn. at 17, 557 A.2d at 1240. 
161. 211 Conn. at 17-18, 557 A.2d at 1241. 
162. Acting Superintendent of Schools of Liverpool Central School Dist. v. United Liverpool 
Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 509, 513-14, 369 N.E.2d 746, 749, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189, 192 (1977). 
163. Id. at 513, 369 N.E.2d at 749, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 192. 
164. See Iowa City Community School Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 139, 146-53 
(Iowa 1983) (Reynoldson, C.J. dissenting) and sources cited therein; Kearny PBA Local #21 v. 
Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 217, 405 A.2d 393, 397-98 (1979). 
165. Iowa City, 343 N.W.2d at 146. 
166. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 66 Wis. 2d 469, 485, 225 N.W.2d 658, 
666-67 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 482 (1976) (quoting Cox & BoK, LABOR LAW 970-71 (7th ed. 1969)). 
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lective bargaining and arbitration to protect the political process. 167 In 
essence, this is the nondelegability argument, extended beyond limiting 
negotiations. Even if the subject in general is negotiable, the employer is 
precluded from agreeing to limit its discretion in certain areas by giving 
up its authority to make final decisions to an arbitrator. 
The third argument is closely related to the second. It contends that 
the standard of review of arbitration awards in the public sector should 
be broader than in the private sector because of the statutory responsibili-
ties imposed on public employers to provide public services. 168 Accord-
ing to this theory, any decision that would interfere with the ability of the 
public employer to perform its statutory functions would violate public 
policy.169 
The fourth argument for a more extensive review of arbitration 
awards in the public sector is the prevalence of employment-related law 
which governs employers and employees in the public sector. 170 Because 
of the pervasive statutory regulation of the employment relationship, is-
sues presented for arbitration frequently are intertwined with statutory 
issues. 171 Advocates of a stringent standard of review assert that because 
of this interrelationship between statutory and contractual issues, the 
167. Charles City Community School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 275 N.W.2d 
766, 770-71(Iowa1979); DePaulo v. City of Albany, 49 N.Y.2d 994, 996-97, 406 N.E.2d 1064, 1066, 
429 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (1980) (Wachtler, J., concurring) ("In view of the singular responsibility and 
trust necessarily reposed in our police it would seem essential that the determination as to whether 
an officer should remain on the force, at least in cases where the conduct in question concerns a 
violation of the officer's oath, should be made only by those persons entrusted by the public with that 
responsibility. Only those persons may be assumed to have in mind the public interest of the com-
munity, and only they are directly answerable to that community.") 
168. Brief for the United States Postal Service on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, United 
States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) cert 
dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1987). See also United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter 
Carriers, 107 S. Ct. 2094 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., On Application for Stay of the Mandate of the Court 
of Appeals); Niagara Wheatfield Administrators Ass'n v. Niagara Wheatfield Central School Dist., 
44 N.Y.2d 68, 73, 375 N.E.2d 37, 40, 404 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (1978) ("The restraints imposed by public 
policy on the scope of the public employment collective bargaining process stem from the need 'to 
protect the public by assuring, at all times, the orderly and uninterrupted operation and functions of 
government.' (Civil Service Law, §' 200.) A public employer may not, through a collective bargain-
ing agreement, jeopardize its effectiveness by relinquishing control of essential facets of its 
operation.") 
169. See cases cited at note 168 supra. 
170. See Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907, 922-23, 391 A.2d 1173, 1181 (1978) (Weisberger, J., 
dissenting) ("If this court should choose to· abdicate from any meaningful function in the review of 
such determinations, the practical enforcement of a large body of public law would be left to the 
untrammeled and unreviewable discretion of arbitrators. I think that the interest of the people of this 
state in the enforcement and application of laws relating to education and the rights and responsibili-
ties of those who carry out the educational function is far too compelling in nature to warrant such 
abstention on our part. Even the most rudimentary demands of consistency and consonance would 
be set at nought by such a system, since arbitrators have no obligation even to provide reasons for 
their determinations.'') 
17 I. See, e.g., Faculty Ass'n of Dist. 205 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 175 Ill. App. 3d 
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courts must monitor arbitration closely to insure that arbitrators are not 
usurping the court's role as interpreter of legislative enactments. 172 A 
review of each of these arguments demonstrates that none adequately 
supports a more stringent standard of review for arbitration awards in 
the public sector than the review applied in the private sector. 
A. The Acceptability and Efficacy of Arbitration in the Public Sector 
The argument that the presumption of arbitrability should not apply 
in the public sector because of the lack of acceptability and efficacy of 
arbitration is least persuasive and therefore, will be disposed of ini-
tially. 173 Arbitration provides the same advantages in the public sector 
as it offers in the private sector. Arbitration is a fast, inexpensive method 
of resolving disputes as to the meaning and interpretation of the con-
tract.174 Additionally, it reduces the workload of the courts. 11s 
In states where arbitration is statutorily mandated, the public policy 
favoring arbitration may be even stronger than the federal labor policy 
underlying the Trilogy.116 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
880, 530 N.E.2d 548, 1251 Ill. Dec. 390 (1988); Board of Trustees for State Technical Colleges v. 
Federation of Technical College Teachers, Local 1942, 179 Conn. 184, 425 A.2d 1247 (1979). 
172. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. An extensive debate has taken place among 
professional arbitrators and academicians about the extent to which arbitrators' should decide ques-
tions of external law, particularly where there is an arguable conflict between the law and the con-
tract. See Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology. Law and Labor Arbitration, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
2CITH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1 (1967); Howlett, The Arbitra-
tor. the NLRB, and the Courts, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACAD-
EMY OF ARBITRATOR 67 (1967); Meltzer, The Role of Law in Arbitration: Rejoinder. PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE 21ST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 58 (1968); Howlett, The 
Role of Law in Arbitration. A Reprise, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 64 (1968); Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE 21ST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 42 (1968); St. Antoine, 
Discussion. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ANNuAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRA-
TORS 75 (1968); Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23RD 
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 29 (1970); Feller, The Coming End of 
Arbitration's Golden Age, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY 
OF ARBITRATORS 97 (1976). 
173. While this argument was articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Acting Superin-
tendent of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. v. United Liverpool Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y 2d 
509, 369, N.E.2d 746, 399 N.Y.S. 2d 189 (1977), a case which has not been overruled, New York 
courts have not strictly applied Liverpool's presumption against arbitrability. Craver, supra note 10, 
at 337. Some New York courts have applied the standard, however, so the arguments supporting 
Liverpool retain some force. Id. at 337 n.44. In addition, other courts have denied arbitration on the 
basis of their view as to the merits of the grievance, which may well indicate unarticulated accept-
ance of the views of the Liverpool court. See cases cited supra at notes 80-85 and accompanying text. 
See also Craver, supra note 10, at 336 where he suggests that the decision in Sullivan, supra notes 80-
82 and accompanying text, may have been motivated by distrust of grievance arbitration in the 
public sector. 
174. Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities v. Mahoning 
County TMR Educ. Ass'n, 22 Ohio St. 3d 80, 83, 488 N.E.2d 872, 875 (1986). 
175. Id., 488 N.E.2d at 875. 
176. Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed. of Teachers, 464 Pa. 92, 99, 346 A.2d 35, 39 (1975). 
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declared: 
[i]t is not difficult to perceive the reason for the statutory requirement 
that grievances be submitted to arbitration. If a dispute arises as to the 
interpretation or application of the agreement there must be a mecha-
nism for resolving the dispute or the agreement is meaningless. Histor-
ically, the primary means of resolving such disputes was the strike and 
many agreements in the private sector retain this mechanism for at 
least some types of dispute. However, resolution of all disputes by re-
sort to economic force is costly to the parties, and more importantly to 
the public. The General Assembly therefore chose to make the widely 
used procedure of labor arbitration mandatory under the PERA. This 
brings the special expertise of labor arbitrators to bear on the often 
difficult problems of administering the collective bargaining agreement 
while assuring parties that their agreement will be effective and guar-
anteeing both the parties and the public that such disputes will not 
disrupt peaceful labor relations or interrupt public service. 177 
Thus, as in the private sector, grievance arbitration in the public sector 
serves as a substitute for strikes and other disruptions of harmonious la-
bor relations. 178 Arbitration of even frivolous grievances has a therapeu-
tic effect, not only in the private sector, but also in the public sector. 179 
Moreover, arbitration encourages consistent administration of manage-
ment policy by providing an impartial review of management decisions 
with the power to reverse those decisions which are inconsistent with 
articulated policy.180 
177. Id. at 100, 346 A.2d at 39 (footnotes omitted). 
178. While strikes in the public sector are illegal in many states, they do occur. "With no sound 
mechanism for resolving such disputes [about contractual rights] available, the frequent use of eco-
nomic force ... becomes a strong possibility." Baird & McArthur, Constitutional Due Process and 
the Negotiation of Grievance Procedures in Public Employment, 5 J. L. Eouc. 209, 229 (1976). Even 
in the absence of economic force, the employee frustration which results from the inability to resolve 
disputes can destroy the harmonious relationship between employers and employees that collective 
bargaining laws seek to achieve. Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 481 Pa. 66, 70, 391 A.2d 1318, 1320. Because of the absence of the right to strike in many 
jurisdictions, the grievance and arbitration procedure, which enforces collectively bargained rights, 
will serve to establish employee faith in the bargaining process, furthering the goal of industrial 
peace. Comment, Defining the Scope of Grievance Arbitration in Public Education Employment Con-
tracts, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 814, 822 (1974); Comment, Developments in the Law-Public Employ-
ment, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1611, 1721 (1984) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. ("By ensuring 
protection of employees' rights under bargaining agreements, mandatory grievance arbitration 
would compensate public employees for denial of the right to strike."). 
179. "Even frivolous grievances are to be sent to arbitration because of arbitration's therapeutic 
value in providing a safety valve for the ventilation of issues which might spill over in wildcat strikes 
or job actions." Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm., 481 Pa. at 71, 391 A.2d at 1320 
(citing United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)). While public employ-
ees have other avenues of redress for certain types of complaints, Baird and McArthur, supra note 
178, at 227, those avenues are not available for all disputes and may be less desirable than arbitration 
because of perceptions about their viability. See Stanley, What Are Unions Doing to Merit Systems?, 
31 Pue. PERSONNEL REV. 108, ll l-12 (1970); Hayford & Pegnetter, Grievance Adjudication for 
Public Employees: A Comparison of Rights Arbitration and Civil Service Appeals Procedures, 35 ARB. 
J. 22, 26-27 (Sept. 1980). 
180. Coleman, supra note 9, at 97-98. 
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The increasing use of grievance arbitration in the public sector since 
Acting Superintendent of Schools v. United Liverpool Faculty Association 
has established the viability of arbitration as a dispute resolution mecha-
nism.181 The increase in the number of states that statutorily mandate 
arbitration procedures is further evidence of the recognition of the bene-
fits of arbitration in the public sector. 182 These benefits make the pre-
sumption of contractual arbitrability as appropriate for governmental 
collective bargaining agreements as it is for agreements of private 
employers. 
B. The Government as Employer and Arbitration Enforcement 
The second and third arguments for greater scrutiny of public sector 
grievance arbitration by the courts focus on the fact that the government 
is the employer. Proponents of these contentions urge that the public 
interest implications of arbitration in governmental employment require 
both judicial review of arbitration awards on the merits and careful scru-
tiny of both pre-arbitration and post-arbitration public policy claims. If 
there is no public policy violation, however, then it is difficult to under-
stand why the fact that the government is the employer justifies overturn-
ing an arbitration award based on disagreement with the decision on the 
merits. The same policies that favor judicial deference to arbitration 
awards in the private sector support deference in the public sector. As 
declared by the Ohio Supreme Court: 
[arbitration] provides the parties with a relatively speedy and inexpen-
sive method of conflict resolution and has the additional advantage of 
unburdening crowded court dockets. The whole purpose of arbitration 
would be undermined if courts had broad authority to vacate an arbi-
trator's award. Thus, this court has stated, "[i]t is the policy of the law 
to favor and encourage arbitration and every reasonable intendment 
will be indulged to give effect to such proceedings and to favor the 
regularity and integrity of the arbitrator's acts."183 
181. See F. ELKOURl & E. A. ELKOURl, How ARBITRATION WORKS 17 (Supp. 1985-87) ("Leg-
islative and judicial preference for grievance arbitration has significantly increased in the public sec-
tor."); Comment, Developments in the Law, supra note 178, at 1720. 
182. States that mandate grievance arbitration in order to resolve labor disputes peacefully in-
clude Alaska (ALASKA STAT.§ 23.40.210 (1990)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 447.401(West1981 
& Supp. 1991)), Illinois (ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, ~ 1608 (1989) (public employees) and ILL. REV. 
STAT. ch. 48, ~ 1710(c) (1986) (educational employees)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT.§ 179.38 (Supp. 
1991)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CoDE ANN.§ 4117.10 (Anderson 1980 & Supp. 1989)), and Pennsylvania 
(PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1991)). The two Illinois statutes and the Ohio 
statute are the most recently enacted comprehensive collective bargaining statutes, in 1983 and 1984 
respectively. In addition to the states with mandatory grievance arbitration, many state statutes 
authorize grievance arbitration. Comment, Developments in the Law, supra note 178, 1720 n.23. See, 
e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4330 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-7 (West 1988). 
183. Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities v. Mahoning 
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As in the private sector, the collective bargaining agreement creates 
a system of self-government and empowers the arbitrator to resolve dis-
putes based on the intent of the parties as reflected in the contract lan-
guage, the practices of the parties and the industry, and the effect of a 
decision on morale and productivity. 184 It is the arbitrator, not the 
court, who is the designated interpreter of the parties' intent. 185 Enforce-
ment of the arbitrator's award, within the limits set by the Trilogy stan-
dards, is enforcement of the bargain of the parties. 186 Thus, courts 
reviewing public sector awards should avoid review on the merits in the 
guise of deciding whether the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority. 
The courts should enforce awards despite their disagreement with the 
results, so long as there is no violation of public policy and the Enterprise 
Wheel, 187 or corresponding statutory standards, are met. 188 A public 
employer unhappy with an arbitrator's decision can, and should resolve 
the problem in subsequent contract negotiations. 189 
At first blush, the fact that the government is the employer suggests 
a heightened public interest in arbitrator's decisions that might provide a 
justification for an expansive review of arbitrator's awards on grounds of 
public policy. A broad public policy exception to arbitral deference 
would permit the court to void awards or deny arbitration on public pol-
icy grounds, regardless of whether there was any direct conflict with a 
statute or constitutional provision. Thus, the court could confine arbitra-
tion consistent with its determination of the public interest. 
County TMR Educ. Ass'n, 22 Ohio St. 3d 80, 83-84, 488 N.E.2d 872, 875 (1986) (citing Campbell v. 
Automatic Die & Products Co., 162 Ohio St. 321, 329, 123 N.E.2d 401, 405 (1954)). 
184. See Ramsey County v. AFSCME Council 91, 309 N.W.2d 785, 790-91 (Minn. 1981) which 
cites the Trilogy extensively to support its interpretation of the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act. 
The Ramsey court stated that "[t]he arbitrator plays a key role in the continuing interaction between 
and among the citizens of the industrial community. In resolving industrial strife, his function is to 
ascertain the parties' intended standard of behavior." Id. at 791. 
185. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960) ("It is the 
arbitrator's construction which was bargained for."). 
186. See Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 66, 70, 391 
A.2d 1318, 1320 (1978); Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907, 912, 391 A.2d 1173, 1176 (1978). 
187. 363 U.S. at 597, 599 (the courts should enforce the arbitration award so long as it draws its 
essence from the collective bargaining agreement). 
188. For cases in which the result would have been different had the court applied the limited 
standard of review advocated here, see City of Hartford v. Local 760, Int'! Ass'n of Firefighters, 6 
Conn. App. 11, 502 A.2d 429 (1986); Board of Control of Ferris State College v. Michigan 
AFSCME Council 25, 138 Mich. App. 170, 361 N.W.2d 342 (1984); County College of Morris Staff 
Ass'n v. County College of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 495 A.2d 865 (1985); Musser v. County of Centre, 
101 Pa. Commw. 193, 515 A.2d 1027 (1986), aff'd, 513 Pa. 380, 548 A.2d 1194 (1988). 
189. As the Iowa Supreme Court stated in response to an argument for a broader standard of 
review for public sector collective bargaining cases "[i]f public bodies are unfairly hamstrung by 
decision of arbitrators, the remedy is either meticulous contracting or statutory change in the scope 
of our review." City of Des Moines v. Central Iowa Pub. Employees Council, 369 N.W.2d 442, 445 
(Iowa 1985). 
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Application of a broad public policy exception, however, gives insuf-
ficient weight to the established public policy favoring arbitration. 
Where the state has enunciated a policy favoring arbitration, either by 
statute or case law, that policy must be recognized as a significant factor 
in the decisionmaking process of a court faced with a challenge to arbi-
tration. In adopting a policy favoring arbitration, the state has recog-
nized the benefits of arbitration as a method of resolving disputes. 190 
These benefits will be largely illusory if the scope of arbitration is severely 
limited, not by contract but by the courts, and the finality of awards is 
diminished by extensive court review. 191 In deciding public policy based 
challenges to arbitration, courts must recognize and consider the impor-
tant public policy favoring both collective bargaining192 and dispute reso-
lution by final and binding arbitration. 193 
In addition to statutory provisions mandating or authorizing griev-
ance arbitration, statutory provisions regarding the relationship of the 
collective bargaining agreement to other laws indicate a policy favoring 
collective bargaining and arbitration that must be taken into account by 
courts faced with challenges to arbitration. Connecticut,194 Ohio, 195 and 
Illinois, 196 for example, have provisions giving the collective bargaining 
agreement priority over other laws under certain conditions. In City of 
190. The benefits of arbitration are enumerated supra notes 174-86 and accompanying text. 
191. See Edwards, supra note 57, at 34; Ray, Protecting the Parties' Bargain After Misco: Court 
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards, 64 IND. L.J. I, 11 (1988). As stated by Professor Ray, "[t]he 
problem of delay cannot be overstated." Id. at 12. "Delay caused by judicial review can cause 
uncertainty, interfere with the bargaining process and undermine the union." Id. 
192. Judge Edwards emphasizes that a broad public policy exception undermines the "explicit 
public policy underlying the duty to bargain." Edwards, supra note 57, at 5. See discussion of this 
issue infra notes 201-23 and accompanying text. 
193. In AFSCME v. State, 124 Ill. 2d 246, 262, 529 N.E.2d 534, 541, 124 Ill. Dec. 553, 560 
(1988), the court properly recognized the importance of the "public policy of promoting constructive 
relationships between public employers and public employees, and the public policy which requires 
finality in arbitration awards." See further discussion of AFSCME supra and infra notes 130-32 and 
204-21 and accompanying text. 
194. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 7-474(b) (West 1989) provides that once the collective bargain-
ing agreement has been approved by the appropriate legislative body, it takes precedence over char-
ters, special acts, ordinances, and rules and regulations of the civil service commission or the 
employer. 
195. OHIO REV. CoDE ANN.§ 4117.10 (Anderson 1980 Supp.) provides that agreements negoti-
ated pursuant to the bargaining law prevail over other laws except as otherwise specified by the 
legislature. In State ex rel Rollins v. Board of Education, 10 Ohio St. 3d 123, 532 N.E.2d 1289 
(1988), the Ohio Supreme Court held that the collective bargaining agreement prevailed over the 
conflicting statute governing teacher tenure. 
196. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 48, ~ 1615 (Smith-Hurd 1986), which covers public employees other 
than educational employees, provides that in the event of conflict between the bargaining statute and 
any other law, executive order or administrative regulation relating to wages, hours and conditions 
of employment and employment relations, the bargaining statute and agreements negotiated there-
under control and prevail. Id. ~ 1615 (a). The statute further states that the contract supersedes 
contrary statutes, charters, ordinances, rules or regulations relating to wages, hours and conditions 
of employment and employment relations adopted by the employer. Id:~ 1615 (b). 
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DeKalb v. IAFF Local 1236, 191 the Illinois Appellate Court declined to 
consider the argument that the statutory provision giving the collective 
bargaining agreement priority over other laws mandated upholding the 
arbitrator's award against a claim that it conflicted with the Pension 
Code, because the collective bargaining statute did not cover firefighters 
at the time the grievance arose. 198 
Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that the statutory 
provision for contractual supersedure of other laws upon approval of the 
contract by the legislature was inoperative where the letter submitting 
the contract for approval did not point out to the legislature the conflict 
that was the basis for setting aside the arbitrator's award. 199 While these 
statutory supersedure provisions have not frequently been a factor in 
court decisions reviewing arbitration awards to date, they indicate a leg-
islative intent that collective bargaining agreements and arbitration 
awards interpreting those agreements prevail over other laws to the ex-
tent indicated in the particular statute. These provisions further support 
deferential judicial review and may play an increasingly significant role 
in court decisions reviewing arbitration awards. 200 
Not only do statutory provisions regarding arbitration support a 
narrow reading of the public policy exception, but invalidation of arbitra-
tion awards on public policy grounds where no statute is violated sub-
verts the public policy favoring collective bargaining, for it allows the 
employer to ignore contractual provisions and take unilateral action 
without regard to the duty to bargain. 201 Furthermore, in deciding such 
cases, the courts are usurping the duty of the National Labor Relations 
Board to determine mandatory subjects ofbargaining.202 Judge Edwards 
illustrates these arguments with a private sector case, 203 but a public sec-
tor case, AFSCME v. State of Illinois, 204 equally exemplifies the 
problems. 
197. 182 Ill. App. 3d 367, 538 N.E.2d 867, appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 106 (Ill. 1989). 
198. The court did suggest, however, that the collective bargaining statute should not be broadly 
read to supersede other laws. Id. at 375-76, 538 N.E.2d at 872-73. 
199. Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, Local 1942, 179 Conn. 184, 
197-98, 425 A.2d 1247, 1253-54 (1979). 
200. The Illinois and Ohio statutes are relatively recent enactments, 1983 and 1984 respectively. 
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, ii 1601-27 (Smith-Hurd 1986 & Supp. 1987); Omo REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4117.01 -.23 (Anderson 1980 & Supp. 1989). 
201. Edwards, supra note 57, at 28. Judge Edwards analyzes this problem in the private sector 
context, but it is equally applicable to the public sector. 
202. Id. at 28. This argument applies equally to public sector administrative agencies charged 
with the task of enforcing public sector collective bargaining laws. 
203. Judge Edwards uses Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987), to illustrate his point. Edwards, supra note 57, at 28. 
204. 124 Ill. 2d 246, 529 N.E.2d 534 (1988). 
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In AFSCME, the circuit court vacated an arbitration award that re-
instated two employees who were discharged for patient abuse based on 
an unauthorized absence from the mental health facility in which they 
worked, during which a patient in an area in which they did not work 
died. 205 The circuit court held that the award "represented a severe and 
extreme departure from the public policy of Illinois, which is to protect 
not to endanger mental patients."206 If the employer refused to bargain 
about the disciplinary penalty for employees accused of patient abuse, the 
employer would have violated the statutory duty to bargain, for discipli-
nary penalties are within the scope of mandatory bargaining subjects. 207 
Yet the employer in AFSCME accomplished the same result as if it had 
refused to bargain altogether when it negotiated limitations on its right to 
discipline for patient abuse but refused to comply with them, instead le-
gally challenging the arbitrator's award. The employer's refusal to com-
ply with the contract not only did not violate the law, but was 
accomplished with the aid and sanction of the court. In effect, discipli-
nary penalties for patient abuse were removed from the scope of required 
bargaining because the court gave the employer "an unfettered right (at-
tained outside of collective bargaining) to discharge employees who [en-
gage in patient abuse]",208 despite the fact that the parties' contract as 
interpreted by the arbitrator limited that right. Since the employer was 
effectively given the right to take unilateral action with respect to disci-
plinary penalties for patient abuse, disciplinary penalties have been re-
moved from the scope of required bargaining. 209 This violates the public 
policy favoring collective bargaining. 
"The employer is left holding all the cards",210 for the employer can 
retain the employees if it so chooses, despite the court decision that their 
reinstatement would violate public policy. Retention would not violate 
the collective bargaining agreement or any express statutory provision, 
and thus there would be no basis for any legal challenge to the em-
ployer's decision. Therefore, the enforcement of public policy is not allo-
cated to the courts, as supporters of a broad public policy exception 
would urge. Instead, the employer retains control over whether or not 
the public policy is enforced, thereby defeating the purpose of the public 
205. Id. at 250-51, 529 N.E. 2d at 536. The circuit court's decision was reversed by the Illinois 
Appellate Court. Id. at 250, 529 N.E.2d at 535. 
206. Id. at 252, 529 N.E.2d at 536. 
207. See City of Decatur v. AFSCME, Local 268, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 522 N.E.2d 1219. 
208. Edwards, supra note 57, at 27. 
209. See Allied Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 183-88 (1971) (em-
ployer can lawfully make unilateral changes with respect to permissive subjects of bargaining). 
210. Edwards, supra note 57, at 28. 
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policy exception. Accordingly, the circuit court in AFSCME thwarted 
the public policy favoring collective bargaining to uphold a public policy, 
protection of mental patients, which is enforceable only at the will of the 
employer. The employer, and not the court, retains the right to decide 
which public policy will be enforced and in what manner. 
Because arbitration is "part and parcel of the collective bargaining 
process,"211 the arbitrator is merely reading the contract for the parties, 
giving meaning to the negotiated provisions or, if necessary, striking a 
"supplementary bargain."212 Accordingly, the arbitrator's award should 
not be deemed to violate public policy unless the parties could not law-
fully have negotiated contract provisions identical to the terms of the 
award.213 Put another way, "(t]he courts should only set aside arbitra-
tion awards where the award requires the employer to take some action 
which, if taken by an employer on its own with no arbitral compulsion, 
would violate the law."214 
It might be argued that in the public sector, the legislative body has 
delegated to the employer, the Department of Mental Health in 
AFSCME for example, the authority to determine public policy with re-
spect to its mission, care of the mentally ill.215 Thus, the arbitrator 
should not be permitted to reject the employer's determination that pub-
lic policy requires the discharge of employees. This argument, however, 
ignores the countervailing public policy favoring collective bargaining 
and arbitration.216 So long as the legislature has authorized, indeed re-
quired, the employer to negotiate about the subject, and the employer has 
agreed to binding arbitration, the arbitrator's judgment about the propri-
ety of discharge should be respected unless it conflicts with positive law 
or requires the employer to violate the law. The employer can reserve to 
itself the power to discharge employees without arbitral review through 
negotiation. If it does not do so, then it has exercised its authority by 
making employee terminations subject to the review of an arbitrator, as 
permitted by law. Having made the decision, the public employer, like 
the private employer should be bound by it so long as it violates no stat-
211. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
212. St. Antoine, supra note 28, at 1140; Warrior &- Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578, 581. 
213. See Craver, supra note 1, at 43; Edwards, supra note 57, at 33; Hexter, supra note 43, at 
107. 
214. Hexter, supra note 43, at 107. 
215. This argument was not addressed in AFSCME. 
216. The validity of this argument also will depend on whether the statute on which the em-
ployer is relying is susceptible to an interpretation that the legislature committed to the employer the 
discretion to make the relevant determinations of public policy. If the statute is sufficiently explicit 
in committing the issue to the exclusive determination of the employer, then the award will be sub-
ject to rejection under the narrow public policy exception. 
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ute, decisional law, or constitutional provision.217 
The example of AFSCME illustrates that broad public policy review 
of arbitration awards in the public sector impinges on the collective bar-
gaining policy in the same manner as in the private sector. While in 
some states the scope of bargaining in the public sector may be narrower 
than under the National Labor Relations Act, this difference does not 
support a broader public policy standard for review of arbitration 
awards. If the arbitration award interferes with the employer's decision 
on a matter which, by statute, the employer is prohibited from delegat-
ing, (i.e., an illegal subject of bargaining), then the award will be vacated 
under a narrow public policy exception as contrary to law.218 If the 
award deals with a mandatory bargaining subject, denial of enforcement 
will interfere with the public policy favoring collective bargaining and 
arbitration, as noted above, and the award should be upheld unless it is 
contrary to law. If the award deals with a permissive subject of bargain-
ing,219 the same result should obtain. While overturning such an award 
would not interfere with the duty to bargain over mandatory subjects, it 
would frustrate the policy favoring arbitration, inviting "discord and dis-
trust and creat[ing] an atmosphere wherein a harmonious relationship 
would virtually be impossible to maintain. " 220 So long as there is no 
express legal prohibition, the employer should be held to its bargain.221 
217. See Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v. Mahon-
ing County TMR Educ. Ass'n, 22 Ohio St. 3d 80, 84, 488 N.E.2d 872, 876 (1986) where the court 
stated: 
The board argues, and the court of appeals decided, that collective bargaining agreements 
are not as binding upon public employers as they are upon private employers. It is time to 
put an end to that notion and categorically reject the argument. Today's decision gives 
notice that negotiated collective bargaining agreements are just as binding upon public 
employers as they are upon private employers. 
218. See, e.g., Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 777, 358 
N.E.2d 878, 880, 390 N.Y.S.2d S3, SS (1976) (in reviewing arbitration award, court held that the 
provision in the collective bargaining agreement which purported to relinquish the right of the 
school board to terminate a probationary teacher without reasons was void as against public policy). 
219. In some states, there is no permissive category of bargaining subjects. See, e.g., Ridgefield 
Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 162, 393 A.2d 278, 287 (1978) 
(arbitration of grievances including transfers and reassignments was enjoined because the court did 
not find the existence of a permissive category of negotiable matters in public employment labor 
relations). 
220. Pittsburgh Joint Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 66, 74, 391 A.2d 1318, 
1322 (1978). See Iowa City Community School Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 139, 
141 (Iowa 1983). 
221. In Drivers Union Local 69S v. County of Sauk, 103 Wis. 2d 691, 310 N.W.2d 6S2 (1981), 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court; in refusing to vacate an arbitration award on public policy grounds, 
noted: 
It appears that the county's true complaint is that discipline and discharge of deputy sher-
iffs is subject to arbitration. This is a matter for the bargaining table or for the legislature, 
and is not within the province of the court to decide in the course of reviewing an award 
under ch. 788, Stats. 
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Not only does a broad public policy exception interfere with collec-
tive bargaining policy, but it invites the court to substitute its views as to 
the meaning of the contract for those of the arbitrator.222 Such judicial 
activism is directly contrary to the principles underlying the policy favor-
ing arbitration as a method of dispute resolution, and will negate the 
benefits of arbitration. 223 
These same considerations support a narrow view of public policy in 
deciding pre-arbitration disputes about legal arbitrability, for such dis-
putes are, in actuality, public policy challenges to arbitration presented 
before, rather than after the award. Where a matter unequivocally has 
been committed by the legislature to the exclusive determination of the 
employer, arbitration should be denied as contrary to law. Courts must 
engage in careful reading of statutory provisions, however, with particu-
lar attention to those dealing with matters of governmental policy that 
affect the mission of the agency,224 to insure that the policy in favor of 
arbitration is not unnecessarily trammeled by vague and archaic notions 
of sovereignty.22s A broad application of the nondelegability doctrine, 
which results in a court holding inarbitrable grievances over issues ad-
dressed by other legislation regardless of whether such legislation evi-
dences a clear legislative commitment to exclusive governmental 
decisionmaking, produces a broad public policy exception to judicial def-
erence to arbitration.226 For all of the reasons set forth, the broad public 
222. Ray, supra note 191, at 34; Edwards, supra note 57, at 23. As Judge Edwards notes, "[a]ny 
result-oriented judge who has a modicum of intelligence can find a perceived conflict between an 
arbitrator's award and the judge's own notions of public policy." Id. at 34. 
223. See supra notes 25-41, 174-80, 183-88 and accompanying text. 
224. Craver, supra note 10, at 341. 
225. By enacting a statute requiring government employers to bargain, the legislature has elimi-
nated the argument that the doctrine of sovereignty precludes compelling the employer to negotiate 
an agreement and comply with the agreement negotiated. See K. HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING 
LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 14-15 (1967). 
226. While a complete discussion of the nondelegability doctrine is beyond the scope of this 
article, the suggested approach to arbitrability determinations and arbitration enforcement requires 
that the nondelegability doctrine be applied with care, in light of the negative consequences of broad 
application for the system of collective bargaining and arbitration. Under this approach, the scope 
of nondelegable subjects would be much narrower than many courts have found to date. Only an 
unequivocal legislative declaration that a subject is committed exclusively to governmental determi-
nation should exempt a subject from negotiation and arbitration. Compare Board of Educ. v. 
Areman, 41 N.Y.2d 527, 362 N.E.2d 943, 394 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1977) (Court affirmed trial court's 
decision granting stay of arbitration where union sought to enforce contract clause which limited the 
right of the Board of Education to inspect teacher personnel files based on the court's determination 
that, despite the absence of any statutory prohibition on negotiation of such a clause, the Board of 
Education had no authority to bargain away its right to review personnel files) with Board of Educ. 
v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, Local No. 3, 464 Pa. 92, 96, 97, 101, 346 A.2d 35, 37, 40 (1975) 
(Court affirmed the trial court's decision to compel arbitration of a dispute over the dismissal of a 
nontenured teacher, holding that statutory provisions authorizing the school board to adopt and 
enforce regulations regarding the conduct of teachers and to remove employees for various causes 
did not create nondelegable duties that would prevent arbitration of the dismissal). 
1990] THE PUBLIC SECTOR 673 
policy exception is inconsistent with an effective system of collective bar-
gaining. Thus, courts faced with pre-arbitration challenges to arbi-
trability should order arbitration, applying the presumption in favor of 
arbitrability, unless it is unquestionably clear that the arbitrator could 
enter no award that would be consistent with the law.227 The risk of 
such a decision is small, for if the award issued conflicts with the law, 
post-arbitration review of the award is available under the public policy 
exception. 
If the presumption of arbitrability causes a court to err, holding ar-
bitrable a dispute that the legislature intended to commit to the exclusive 
determination of a public body, the error is subject to correction by the 
legislature or the employer in negotiations. Subjects that in some states 
have been held to be nondelegable duties of governmental bodies, in 
others have been found to be proper subjects for arbitration. 228 While it 
is the role of each state's legislature to make such determinations, and 
differences are to be expected, these differences demonstrate that irrepa-
rable damage to the public interest is unlikely to result from an erroneous 
decision about legislative intent. 
The governmental nature of the employer does not alone warrant 
imposition of more stringent review of arbitration awards, because the 
public interest may be implicated equally by the decision of a private or 
public sector arbitrator.229 An arbitral decision reinstating a bus driver 
227. See, e.g., Board of Trustees, Prairie State College v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 173 
Ill. App. 3d 395, 413, 527 N.E.2d 538, 550 (1988) (determination of possible conflicts with the 
doctrine of nondelegability is best postponed until after the arbitration). For example, in cases in-
volving tenure and appointment determinations, several courts have held that considerations of 
whether proper procedures have been followed in making such determinations are arbitrable, 
although the ultimate decision is statutorily nondelegable. See, e.g., Cohoes City School Dist. v. 
Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976); School Comm. of 
Peabody v. International Union ofElec. Workers, Local 294, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 449, 475 N.E.2d 410 
(1985). In states where this is the law, a court should avoid enjoining arbitration over a tenure or 
appointment decision on the assumption that the arbitrator will intrude improperly into the area of 
nondelegable authority. Rather, the court should assume that the arbitrator will issue a lawful deci· 
sion and allow the arbitration to proceed, subject to post-arbitration review if the arbitrator exceeds 
his or her authority or violates the law by usurping the nondelegable power of the employer. 
228. Compare Lake County Educ. Ass'n v. School Bd. of Lake County, 360 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App.) (arbitrator did not have the authority to evaluate a teacher's performance to deter· 
mine if he had been fired for just cause because that determination was committed to the exclusive 
authority of school board), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 882 (Fla. S. Ct. 1978) with Iowa City Community 
School Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1984) (arbitrator did not exceed 
authority or violate public policy by evaluating a teacher's performance in order to award a salary 
increase) and compare Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School Dist. v. Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School 
Teachers Ass'n, 393 Mich. 583, 227 N.W.2d 500 (1975) (dispute involving nonrenewal of a proba· 
tionary teacher's contract was arbitrable) with Cohoes City School Dist., 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 
878, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (dispute involving nonrenewal of a probationary teacher's contract not 
arbitrable ). 
229. "A railroad or a dock strike may be more damaging to a community than a 'job action' by 
police". H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 25 (1971). There has been 
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employed by a private company creates a greater risk to the public than a 
decision reinstating a file clerk in the state department of transportation, 
when both were discharged for coming to work intoxicated. In addition, 
almost all employers, public and private, operate under one or more stat-
utory mandates that might be implicated by an arbitration decision. 230 
Thus an argument that public employment per se requires a different 
standard for arbitration enforcement because of the level of the public 
interest cannot be sustained. 
C The Effect of the Statutory Context of Public Sector Employment 
Law on Arbitration 
The complex web of statutory regulation of the employment rela-
tionship in the public sector provides a more persuasive justification for a 
greater court role in arbitration, for limited court involvement in arbitra-
tion may leave statutory interpretation to private decisionmakers. While 
statutory regulation of employment in the private sector is increasing,231 
public sector arbitration occurs in the context of an extensive network of 
preexisting laws, ordinances, and regulations. When deciding an arbitra-
tion case, an arbitrator may be faced with statutory232 considerations in 
several ways. First, the statute may be urged as informing the arbitrator 
as to the meaning of the contractual provision which he or she is being 
asked to interpret. 233 Second, the statute may be incorporated in the 
considerable scholarly commentary regarding the differences between collective bargaining in the 
public sector and collective bargaining in the private sector. Much of the debate has focused on the 
power of the union and the employees in the political decisionmaking process. See, e.g., Burton & 
Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 19 YALE L.J. 418, 427 (1970); 
Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974); H. WEL-
LINGTON & R. WINTER, supra, at 7-32; Wollett, The Bargaining Process in the Public Sector: What is 
Bargainable?, 51 OR. L. REV. 177 (1971). By enacting a collective bargaining statute and prescrib-
ing the appropriate scope of bargaining, however, each state legislature has determined the nature 
and extent of power it is willing to give to unions and employees. 
230. Edwards, supra note 57, at 32. Judge Edwards suggests, quite correctly, that a statute like 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act which requires the employer to provide a safe work environ-
ment could provide the basis for setting aside numerous arbitration awards. Id. 
231. 0.E. FELLER, The Impact of External Law Upon Labor Arbitration in THE FUTURE OF 
LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 83, 89 (1976). 
232. For the sake of simplicity the article will refer to employment-related statutes, but ordi-
nances, rules and regulations also affect the arbitrator's decision in the same manner. Statutes pose 
perhaps the most difficult legal issues for they have equal weight with the collective bargaining stat-
ute. See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text. 
233. This argument may take the form of an assertion that the provision was negotiated to be 
consistent with the statute and therefore has a particular meaning, or an assertion that, if the arbitra-
tor interprets the contract as urged by the other party, it will be unlawful. See, e.g., City of Miami v. 
Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 20, 94 Labor Arb. (BNA) 734 (1990) (Richard, Arb.) for an arbitra-
tion decision reflecting various arguments about the relationship of external law to the contract. 
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contract and form the basis of the grievance. 234 Third, the parties may 
ask the arbitrator for a decision based on the statute even where it is not 
incorporated in the contract.235 Fourth, the arbitrator may consider and 
decide a statutory issue even where not expressly authorized by the par-
ties. 236 And finally, the arbitrator's decision may implicate a statute in a 
manner that was neither argued by the parties nor considered by the 
arbitrator. 237 
If the arbitrator relies on a statute to determine the meaning of the 
contract, the arbitrator's award is an interpretation of the agreement, and 
regardless of whether the arbitrator is correct about the meaning of the 
statute, the award should be affirmed if it comports with the Trilogy stan-
dards and is not unlawful. 238 Similarly, where the award implicates a 
statute but does not consider and interpret the statute, the arbitrator is 
not interpreting public law.239 The arbitrator in these situations is not 
interpreting public law. 
If the arbitrator is interpreting a statute directly, however, there are 
different concerns because a private party's interpretation of public law 
will be binding on the litigants. If the arbitrator's interpretation of the 
statute results in an award that is contrary to law or requires the em-
ployer to violate the law, under either standard of review the award will 
be vacated on public policy grounds. But it is certainly possible for an 
arbitrator to interpret the law erroneously in a manner that leads to an 
award that is not itself unlawful. Under these circumstances, review 
under a narrow public policy standard would permit the arbitrator's er-
roneous view of the law to bind the parties. 
City of Saginaw v. Michigan Law Enforcement Union 240 is an exam-
ple of such a case. In Saginaw, the arbitrator considered a grievance 
234. See Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: The 'Common Law of the Shop' v. Exter-
nal Law, 32 ARB. J. 65, 79 (1977). 
235. Id. 
236. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH ANNUAL 
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 97, 110 (1976). 
237. See Edwards, supra note 234, at 79. 
238. Craver, supra note 10, at 349 & n.105. So long as the award does not violate the law, 
erroneous conclusions of law do not warrant a refusal to enforce an award on public policy grounds. 
See Fraternal Order of Police v. Bensinger, 122 Mich. App. 437, 448, 333 N.W.2d 73, 78 (1983). 
Jones Dairy Farm v. Local No. P-1236, UFCW, 760 F.2d 173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 
(1985) applies this rule in a private sector case. 
239. For example, if a city inspector is discharged for accepting a bribe, but reinstated by the 
arbitrator on grounds of employer condonation, the arbitrator is not required to interpret a criminal 
statute that makes acceptance of a bribe by an inspector a misdemeanor. While the employer may 
urge the relevance of the statute as a basis for overturning the award on public policy grounds, a 
narrow review of the award by the court does not abdicate to the arbitrator a question of statutory 
interpretation. 
240. 136 Mich. App. 542, 358 N.W.2d 356 (1984). 
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alleging that the city's unpaid day off program, which was implemented 
as a cost reduction measure, violated the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 241 The arbitrator found that the reduction in work for each em-
ployee was a reduction in the work force, because fewer employees were 
scheduled to work. 242 Thus the arbitrator held that the city had reduced 
the work force for reasons of economy, and was required by the collec-
tive bargaining agreement to follow the specific provisions of the Michi-
gan civil service statute to implement the reduction. By failing to follow 
the statute, the city breached the contract. 243 While the arbitration pro-
ceeding was pending, the county prosecutor filed an action in court to 
enjoin the unpaid day off program on the ground that it violated the civil 
service statute. 244 In a decision directly contrary to the subsequent deci-
sion of the arbitrator, the judge found that the unpaid day off program 
was not a reduction in the work force within the meaning of the statute, 
and denied the injunction. After issuance of the arbitration award, the 
city asked the same court that denied the injunction to vacate the arbitra-
tion award on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and 
the award violated public policy. The court applied the deferential stan-
dard of the Trilogy, despite its prior contrary holding as to the meaning 
of the statute, finding that the parties empowered the arbitrator to inter-
pret the statute by incorporating it in the agreement, and the court was 
not authorized to substitute its judgment as to the interpretation of the 
law for that of the arbitrator. The court also rejected the argument that, 
by requiring layoffs to implement cost reductions, the award violated 
public policy.245 The court correctly concluded that the award merely 
held that the unpaid day off program violated the contract and mandated 
nothing with respect to other cost cutting actions by the city.246 
The court in Saginaw was appropriately deferential to the arbitra-
tor's decision, despite the fact that the interpretation of public law was 
arguably erroneous. 247 The award was not contrary to law even though 
the arbitrator may have erred in his interpretation of the statute. Ac-
cordingly, the court was not asked to enforce an unlawful contract. The 
arbitrator's interpretation of the law was binding only on the parties to 
241. 358 N.W.2d 357. 
242. Id. at 358. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 359. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 362. 
247. The arbitrator's interpretation of the law may be correct, but given the court's contrary 
interpretation of the same law with respect to the same facts, there is at least a plausible argument 
that the arbitrator erred as to the law. 
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the dispute and had no precedential effect.248 While the court's pub-
lished decision enforcing the arbitration award might be cited by parties 
in other cases as an authoritative statutory interpretation, the case is eas-
ily distinguished because it is based on arbitral deference. Any slight 
increase in litigation that might be encouraged by the arbitrator's legal 
interpretation is more than offset by the benefits of encouraging final res-
olution of contractual disputes by arbitration. As for the parties, any 
misinterpretation by the arbitrator can be corrected through negotiations 
for a subsequent collective bargaining agreement. 249 
It is not uncommon in our legal system to allow a decisionmaking 
body other than a court to rule on issues of law, subject to deferential 
court review. Congress has entrusted to administrative agencies the au-
thority to interpret statutes, subject to limited court review.2so Like judi-
cial deference to arbitration decisions, judicial deference to 
administrative agency decisions is not consistent,2s1 but both the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act and Supreme Court precedent support substan-
tial deference to agency decisions which are not contrary to the statute or 
248. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema? 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 
680 (1986). 
249. See Ray, supra note 191, at 12. Encouraging the parties to resolve the issue in negotiations 
is consistent with the policy underlying collective bargaining statutes. Given the short term of most 
labor agreements in the public sector, see Mitchell, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Compen-
sation in the Public Sector, in PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING 130 (B. Aaron, J. Grodin & J. Stem, 
eds. 1979), it is unlikely that the parties will have to live with a highly objectionable award for any 
length of time. Professor Ray points out, however, that resolution of the issue in collective bargain-
ing negotiations may be more difficult if extensive court review of arbitration awards results in court 
proceedings that are not resolved prior to negotiations. Ray, supra note 191, at 12. 
250. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45, reh'g 
denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988); DAVIS, 5 AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 332 (1984); Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and 
the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 217 (1983). Agencies may interpret the law in 
the course of rulemaking or adjudication. Id. at 214 & n.115. While there is considerable scholarly 
and legal debate about the appropriate and constitutional level of deference to administrative agency 
decisions, see Dole v. United Steelworkers, 110 S. Ct. 929, 938-39 (1990) (White, J. dissenting); 
Redish, supra; Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. l (1983); 
Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469 
(1985), courts currently, although not consistently, defer to agency legal interpretations where such 
interpretations are not contrary to the statute. See, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 
U.S. 974 (1986) (FDA's decision not to enforce poisonous substance limit as to a crop of com to be 
used to feed livestock was not contrary to the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act); Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (FDA's refusal to bring an enforcement action to prohibit state use of 
unapproved drugs for lethal injections was within its discretion). 
251. See, e.g., Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (Court declared that the 
interpretation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by the Secretary of Health & Human 
Services, which prohibited health care providers from discriminating against handicapped children, 
was invalid); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Court held 
invalid the Secretary of Labor's decision to reduce a toxic substance standard because it believed the 
evidence linking the substance (benzene) to leukemia was insufficient). 
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in excess of the authority delegated to the agency by Congress. 252 Simi-
lar deferential review of agency decisions by courts occurs at the state 
level.253 
The rationale for deference to agency decisionmaking is similar to 
the rationale for deference to arbitration. Both the agency and the arbi-
trator are chosen as decisionmakers because of their expertise. 254 Both 
administrative adjudication and arbitration provide, at least in theory, a 
method for resolving disputes that is less costly and quicker than litiga-
tion. 255 Judicial review of administrative agency decisions is often defer-
ential; it can be more intrusive than review of arbitrators' decisions under 
the Trilogy standards, however.256 Were administrative adjudication and 
arbitration completely analogous, the administrative review standard 
might be most appropriate for reviewing arbitration decisions, particu-
larly where such decisions involve legal as well as contractual ques-
252. See Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154 (1986) (Court upheld the Mass. Dep't of Public Wel-
fare's interpretation of the Medicaid Program of the Social Security Act because the Secretary of 
Health & Human Services had granted the states flexibility in determining resource criteria for bene-
fits); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866, reh'g denied, 
468 U.S. 1227 (1984) (Court deferred to EPA's interpretation because it is not the courts' responsi-
bility to "assess the wisdom of policy choices"); cases cited supra at note 250; Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). 
253. See, e.g., Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 3, 509 A.2d 489, 490 (1986) (judicial review of 
the decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles is very restricted and the 
court may not retry the case or substitute its own judgment); Barone v. Department of Human 
Services, 107 N.J. 355, 526 A.2d 1055 (1987) (court deferred to agency's decision to deny benefits to 
petitioners as they exceeded the maximum allowable income). 
254. See Redish, supra note 250, at 217; United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). It might be argued that arbitrators have no expertise in statutory interpre-
tation and therefore, their statutory interpretations, unlike their contractual interpretations should 
be entitled to no deference. Many of the statutes that arbitrators are required to interpret, however, 
are quite similar to collective bargaining provisions, e.g., civil service rules and regulations regarding 
discipline, and are not outside the competence of most arbitrators. See Edwards, Commentary, Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 680 (1986) (citing 
Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 438-39 (D.C. Cir. 1983) and noting that under the Civil Service 
Reform Act arbitrators are authorized to decide grievances based on laws, rules and regulations 
covering federal employees). Furthermore, the parties who choose the arbitrator can select an arbi-
trator with legal expertise when the grievance deals with a legal issue. See Jones, supra note 115, at 
889-93. 
255. See Edwards, The Rising Workload and Perceived 'Bureaucracy' of the Federal Couns: A 
Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871, 930-31 
(1983). 
256. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (an order by the NLRB 
for petitioner to reinstate an employee was vacated and the case remanded, because the Court found 
the evidence insufficient to support the Board's decision). In Universal Comera, the Court held that 
the Board's decisions are to be judicially reviewed in the same manner as other administrative deci-
sions, allowing the courts to examine the evidence and to determine whether the agency's decision is 
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Id. at 480-90. Twenty years later, the 
Court decided in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), that in 
addition to evidentiary review, the Court also must determine whether the administrative decision to 
construct a highway through a city park was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Id. at 
416. 
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tions. 257 There are important differences between arbitration and 
adjudication, however, which justify less expansive court review of arbi-
tration awards. 
First, the strong public policy in favor of arbitration supports more 
limited court review of arbitration awards. Second, in arbitration the 
forum for decision is chosen by the parties; in administrative adjudica-
tion the forum is chosen by the legislature. Even when a collective bar-
gaining statute requires that each contract contain an arbitration 
procedure, the parties remain free to define the scope of arbitration and 
limit arbitral determinations of external law. Thus, when the union and 
the employer have chosen to commit the interpretation of a statute as it 
relates to their particular dispute to an arbitrator, the court should re-
spect that choice in the absence of a decision which is clearly unlawful. 
Third, as previously noted, the statutory interpretation in arbitration is 
binding only on the parties to the dispute, who retain the power to cor-
rect the interpretation of the statute in any subsequent collective bargain-
ing agreements, 258 while a determination by an administrative agency as 
to the meaning of the statute has much broader implications. Thus, 
there is limited risk in allowing the arbitrator to interpret the law, subject 
to limited court review, if the parties authorize such an interpretation. 
The currently popular use of arbitration as a method of alternative 
dispute resolution offers another example of a situation where issues of 
law are decided in a nonjudicial forum. Arbitration is used to decide 
issues of law in two related contexts-by agreement of the parties259 or 
through mandatory court-annexed arbitration.260 The United States 
Supreme Court has held that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims are 
enforceable unless the statute creating the cause of action precludes 
waiver of a judicial forum. 261 In considering this issue most recently, in 
257. Judge Edwards suggests that where arbitration is used as an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism outside the labor relations context and the arbitrator is deciding issues oflaw, a standard 
of review analogous to administrative law would be more appropriate than the traditional deference 
to arbitration in the labor arena. Edwards, supra note 255, at 931. See also Division 540, Amalga-
mated Transit Union v. Mercer County Improvement Auth., 76 N.J. 245, 386 A.2d 1290, 98 
L.R.R.M. 2526 (1978) where the court held that the administrative review standard should apply to 
judicial review of an arbitration award where arbitration was compelled by statute. The award at 
issue, however, was an interest arbitration award which set the terms and conditions of employment 
rather than a grievance arbitration award. 
258. In City of Saginaw v. Michigan Law Enforcement Union, 136 Mich. App. 542, 358 N.W.2d 
356 (1984), for example, the employer could negotiate for the express authority in the collective 
bargaining agreement to implement an unpaid day off program. 
259. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) where the 
Supreme Court approved the use of arbitration to decide a claim under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act. 
260. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 570 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
261. See, e.g., Gilmer 111 S. Ct. at 1653, 59 U.S.L.W. 4407, 4409 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors 
680 CHICA.GO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:631 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, the Court relied on the 
" 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements' "262 to force an 
employee to arbitrate his statutory claim of age discrimination. 263 As a 
registered securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange 
("NYSE"), the employee had agreed to arbitation when required by the 
NYSE rules. In enforcing the arbitration agreement, the Court noted 
that" '[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo 
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.' "264 The Court in 
Gilmer evidenced little concern about private interpretation of public law 
where there was no expressed intent by Congress to preclude arbitral 
resolution of disputes under the statute. Further, the Court admonished 
that in seeking Congressional intent regarding arbitration, "it should be 
kept in mind that 'questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a 
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.' "26s Similar 
considerations of policy should influence courts to enforce collective bar-
gaining agreements providing for arbitration of statutory disputes in the 
public sector.266 
The use of mandatory court-annexed arbitration of legal disputes 
also supports enforcement of labor arbitration agreements in the public 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (court upheld enforcement of agree-
ment to arbitrate claims based on antitrust law, interpreting the arbitration agreement to resolve 
doubts regarding the scope of arbitrable claims in favor of arbitration); Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (court enforced agreement to arbitrate claims 
under the Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) 
(court enforced agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)). 
262. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). 
263. See id. at 1657. 
264. Id. at 1652 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). 
265. Id. at 1652 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U. S. at 24). The Court also relied on Moses H. 
Cone and on Warrior cl Gu/fin Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 
614 (1985), to support its conclusion that doubts regarding whether a party agreed to arbitrate an 
issue "should be resolved in favor of arbitration whether the problem at hand is the construction of 
the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id. at 
626 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. at 24-25). 
This policy favoring enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, which is codified in the United 
States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), preempts the authority of the states to require a judicial 
forum for resolution of claims that the parties agreed to arbitrate, even where those claims are 
brought in state court and based on state statutory law. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 
(1984). While the United States Arbitration Act applies only to maritime contracts or contracts 
"evidencing a transaction involving commerce", 9 U.S.C. § 2, the policies favoring arbitration con-
tained in state collective bargaining statutes should be given equal weight. 
266. The Court in Gilmer rejected the argument that the inequality of bargaining power between 
an employee and the employer required a determination that agreements to arbitrate employment 
disputes should not be enforced. 111 S. Ct. at 1655. Where the employees are represented by a 
union, the inequality of bargaining power should be diminished, further supporting enforcement of 
arbitration agreements contained in collective bargaining agreements. 
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sector. Like labor arbitration, court-annexed arbitration programs pro-
vide a rapid, inexpensive alternative to litigation267 and reduce the work-
load of the courts. 268 Although court-annexed arbitration procedures 
typically provide for a trial de novo upon request of either party,269 in the 
absence of appeal the arbitrator's decision interpreting the law is binding 
on the parties. 270 
Thus, like the labor arbitrator, the arbitrator in a court-annexed sys-
tem makes a binding determination of law that may well be erronoous, 
but stands in the absence of appeal. There is an apparent difference in 
the finality of the arbitrator's decision in the two systems, however. The 
decision in court-annexed arbitration becomes final only if the parties 
decide to accept the arbitrator's determination and file no appeal. In la-
bor arbitration, the award is rendered final and binding by the court's 
deferential review, over the objection of the party urging the court to set 
aside the decision. Thus, one party to the labor arbitration is forced by a 
deferential standard of review to accept a disputed private determination 
of a legal issue. This difference is more apparent than real, however, for 
there is no certainty that the parties' acceptance of the arbitrator's deci-
sion in court-annexed arbitration is based on satisfaction, rather tha,n on 
the inability to fund the cost of a second trial271 or the threat that a lesser 
judgment in the trial would subject the party to paying the costs of the 
arbitration272 or the appeal. 213 
267. See Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 570 (E.D.Pa. 1979). Notably, the Kim-
brough court rejected the defendant's argument that arbitration constituted an improper delegation 
of judicial functions to a nonjudicial officer, stating "(c]learly administrative agencies with similar 
adjudicative responsibilities as the arbitration board have long been recognized as not only proper 
but essential to the functioning of an efficient judicial system." Id. at 574 n.18. 
268. In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 229, 112 A.2d 625, 629, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). 
The utility of the labor arbitration model for alternative dispute resolution in other contexts has been 
the subject of debate. See Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 
917, 933-34 (1979) (the success of labor arbitration is dependent on the unique aspects of the system 
of collective bargaining and the role of unions in that system and cannot be transplanted successfully 
to other arenas without significant alteration); Edwards, supra note 255, at 930-36 (while a wholesale 
transfer of labor arbitration to other contexts may be inappropriate, the model is suggestive of the 
possibilities for successful arbitration of disputes in other areas). 
269. The provision for a trial de novo ·upon request protects the right to jury trial. See Kim-
brough, 478 F. Supp. at 567-71; Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 
932 (1978); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978). 
270. Kimbrough, 478 F. Supp. at 567. 
271. See Parker, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (by requiring the plaintiff to pay for two expensive 
medical malpractice actions, frivolous appeals might be discouraged); Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 
261 N.W.2d 434 (despite the expense involved in appearing before the patient compensation board, 
the plaintiff still must bear the cost of a jury trial). 
272. See Kimbrough, 478 F. Supp. at 570 (requiring the challenger to pay for arbitration would 
not penalize appeals). 
273. See In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 229, 112 A.2d 625 (1955) (initially, arbitration costs are paid 
by the county, but must be repaid by the party that challenges the award). Significantly, a party also 
may be bound by the result of the arbitration by refusal to participate in the hearing. New England 
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Moreover, court-annexed arbitration is a compulsory pretrial 
step,274 while the parties to labor arbitration have voluntarily submitted 
their disputes to an arbitrator. The willingness to accept a compulsory 
arbitration system which permits but discourages de novo trials should 
indicate a corresponding willingness to defer to decisions of arbitrators 
voluntarily chosen to decide contractual and legal issues, in the absence 
of a decision which is clearly contrary to law.275 Both systems allow an 
arbitrator to interpret statutes in resolving a dispute between two parties 
and to issue a decision that is neither binding on, nor precedential for, 
other litigants. The risk of erroneous interpretation of the law is thus 
limited, and, in the case of labor arbitration is accepted willingly by the 
parties. 276 
Based on the limited risk of an error of law, the narrow public policy 
exception should be applied in reviewing decisions where the arbitrator 
was required to consider and decide a statutory issue by the contract or 
by the parties. Different considerations are implicated when the arbitra-
tor decides an issue of law without authorization from the contract or the 
parties, however, because the authority of the arbitrator to decide any 
issue is drawn solely from the parties. The appropriate judicial response 
is not to broaden the public policy standard of review, however, but 
rather to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority 
pursuant to the traditional Trilogy or statutory standards. 
This review of the various situations in which a public sector arbi-
trator might interpret the law demonstrates that no broader public policy 
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 715 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (refusal barred party from 
requesting a trial de novo). 
274. See New England Merchants Nat'/ Bank, 556 F. Supp. at 712; Kimbrough, 418 F. Supp. at 
566; Parker, 483 Pa. at 106, 394 A.2d at 932. See also N.Y. CJv. PRAc. L. & R. § 3405 (McKinney 
Supp. 1990); OHIO REv. ConE ANN.§ 15 (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1989). Notably, in New Eng-
land Merchants Nat'/ Bank, the court stated that a party who fails to participate in the arbitration 
forfeits the right to demand a trial de nova. 556 F. Supp. at 715. Thus, the arbitration is not only 
compulsory, but a party is bound by its result when he or she fails to attend the hearing. 
275. See also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, 473 U.S. 568 (1985) where the 
Supreme Court upheld against constitutional challenge based on Article Ill, a statutory scheme 
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). The statute provided 
for arbitral determinations of compensation for pesticide registrants by follow-on registrants using 
the same data, with limited judicial review. As in the case of court-annexed arbitration, participa-
tion in the arbitration proceeding under FIFRA is not voluntary. In order to resolve compensation 
disputes which cannot be settled by negotiation, the registrant must participate in arbitration. 
276. A concern has been raised that subjecting statutory rights to arbitration might deprive indi-
viduals of their rights under statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Edwards, 
supra note 234, at 76. This problem is not unique to the public sector, but applies in the private 
sector as well. The solution is not broad judicial review of arbitration awards, but rather permitting 
the individual to choose a statutory forum for vindication of those rights without requiring exhaus-
tion of the grievance procedure and without holding that arbitration bars subsequent litigation where 
the statutory right cannot be vindicated appropriately in arbitration. This is the solution reached by 
the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
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standard is necessary in the public sector. Arbitration decisions that vio-
late the law or require a party to violate the law can and should be va-
cated, but in the absence of such illegality, public policy supports judicial 
deference to arbitration. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Restricted judicial involvement in labor arbitration in the public sec-
tor has the same benefits as in the private sector and poses no greater risk 
to the public interest. Courts that are faced with arbitration issues in 
public sector employment settings must put aside their reservations 
about grievance arbitration and apply the Trilogy standards, including 
the narrow public policy exception, in both pre-arbitration and post-arbi-
tration enforcement actions. Appropriate judicial deference to arbitra-
tion will insure that the full benefits of collective bargaining are realized 
in the public sector. 
